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INTRODUCTION 
In the twilight days of 2007, Switzerland took decisive action to 
protect children who were being harmed by the application of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction (“Hague Abduction Convention” or “Convention”).1  Its 
Parliament passed the Federal Act on International Child Abduction 
and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and 
Adults (“Swiss Act”).2  The Swiss Act, which should enter into force in 
mid-2009,3 gives important and necessary guidance to Swiss courts 
about the phrase “intolerable situation” in Article 13(b) of the Hague 
Abduction Convention.4  The Swiss Act also directs courts to appoint 
representatives for children in Hague child abduction proceedings.5  
The United States should follow Switzerland’s example and adopt 
similar reforms.  The United States need not pass legislation to do so, 
but rather U.S. courts should follow Switzerland’s lead as the 
opportunities arise in individual cases. 
This Article describes the Swiss law and the context for its adoption 
and then examines the doctrinal and practical significance of its 
provisions.  A few recent U.S. cases are used to illustrate the need for 
courts in the United States to follow Switzerland’s example. For 
 
 1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, art. 13(b),  
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11, 670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Hague Abduction 
Convention], available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text& 
cid=24. 
 2. Loi fédérale sur l’enlèvement international d’enfants et les Conventions de 
La Haye sur la protection des enfants et des adultes [LF-EEA] [Federal Act on 
International Child Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of 
Children and of Adults], Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 34 (2008) 
[hereinafter Swiss Federal Act], available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/ 
2008/33.pdf, translated in Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on International 
Child Abduction, 4 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 139, 161–65 (2008). 
 3.  At the time of publication, the Federal Council had not yet set the date for 
the Act’s entry into force, although it appears as if July 1, 2009 is the target date.   
E-mail from Andreas Bucher to Merle Weiner, Oct. 30, 2008 (on file with author). 
 4. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13(b). 
 5. Id. 
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example, the Swiss interpretation of “intolerable situation” might 
have changed the 2007 decisions of the federal district court in Adan 
v. Avans.6  The Swiss approach to appointing counsel for children in 
Hague child abduction proceedings might also have altered the 
outcome of a 2008 federal district court decision, Mendez-Lynch v. 
Pizzutello.7  After considering potential drawbacks to the Swiss 
reforms, the Article concludes that U.S. courts have little to lose, and 
much to gain, by incorporating these Swiss ideas into the 
adjudication of Hague cases. 
I. THE SWISS LAW 
The Swiss law guides Swiss courts in their application of the Hague 
Abduction Convention,8 a treaty that applies to the transnational 
abduction of children primarily by their parents.  The Convention 
requires contracting states to return an abducted child quickly to the 
child’s country of habitual residence, in most circumstances.9  The 
Convention contains several exceptions to its remedy of return, two 
of which are particularly relevant to the Swiss reform.  Article 13(b) 
provides that a court need not return a child if the return would pose 
“a grave risk that . . . return . . . would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”10  Another portion of Article 13 makes the child’s own 
opinion relevant to the court’s obligation to return the child:  “The 
judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the 
return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned 
 
 6. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007), 
rev’d, In re Adan, 554 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008); Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 
2007 WL 1850910 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 554 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
The Adan v. Avans case came before the district court once in 2006 and twice in 
2007.  The case went up on appeal twice.  The Adan v. Avans case was appealed to 
the Third Circuit in 2006 following the district court’s one-sentence order to return 
the child, and the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the 
case.  In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2006).  On remand, the district court again 
ordered the child’s return.  Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910 
(D.N.J. June 25, 2007).  A month later, the district court rejected motions for 
reconsideration and a stay while the case was appealed to the Third Circuit.  Adan v. 
Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J. July 30, 2007).  On appeal, 
both of the district court’s 2007 decisions were reversed, and the Third Circuit 
dismissed the Hague Convention petition.  In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008). 
The text will discuss all of these decisions, but it is the 2007 trial court decisions that 
are the most illuminating for purposes of this Article. 
 7. Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934 (N.D. 
Ga. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 8. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1. 
 9. Id. art 12. 
 10. Id. art. 13(b). 
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and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is 
appropriate to take account of its views.”11
Reformers in Switzerland became concerned about the application 
of the Hague Abduction Convention, and these defenses in 
particular, after they observed the child custody case of Russell Wood 
and Maya Wood-Hosig (“the Wood case”).12  In the Wood case, the 
mother took her two children from Australia to Switzerland.13  When 
she was discovered in Switzerland, her children were forcibly 
removed from her and institutionalized for a year until they could be 
returned to Australia.14  When the time finally came for the children 
to travel to Australia, the children had to be forced onto the plane.15  
Upon arrival in Australia, the children were again placed in foster 
care.  The father was unable to care for the children, so the children 
could not be returned to him.16  The mother did not return to 
Australia because she faced a criminal action there for the 
abduction.17  Because it took some time for the Australian court to 
issue a custody decision, the children experienced several Australian 
foster homes.18  Eventually, the Australian court gave the mother 
custody and allowed the children to return to Switzerland.19  In short, 
the children ended up with exactly the same arrangement as before 
the Hague proceeding began; yet, they were forced to endure 
enormous distress and hardship as the process played out. 
 
 11. Id. art. 13. 
 12. Parliament of Western Australia, Legislative Assembly-Grievance, Russell 
Wood & Maya Wood-Hosig, Aug. 24, 2006 (Mr. Dan Barron-Sullivan & Mr. David 
Templeman), available at http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl.nsf/ 
iframewebpages/Hansard+-+Advanced+Search (search “Search For” for “Wood” and 
“Date on” for “24/08/2006”) [hereinafter Legislative Assembly-Grievance]; Bucher, 
supra note 2, at 139. 
 13. Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Bucher, supra note 2, at 139. 
 16. Id. at 139–40. 
 17. Id. at 139. 
 18. Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12. 
 19. Id.  Although the father lodged an appeal, the trial judge allowed the 
children to return to Switzerland pending resolution of the appeal.  Id.  This was 
important for the mother’s case because an Australian law said that the judge does 
not have to return the child if the child lives in Australia for two years.  If the 
proceedings had taken another six months, this benchmark would have been 
reached.  Id.; see also Notes of Proceedings for the Fifth Meeting of the Special 
Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction and the First to Review the Practical 
Implementation of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility 
and Measures for the Protection of Children, Nov. 6 (comments of Professor 
Andreas Bucher) (on file with author) [hereinafter Notes of Proceedings]. 
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To address the problems made manifest by the Wood case, 
delegates from Switzerland proposed to the international community 
that a new provision be added to the Convention that would 
supplement Article 13(b).20  At the Fifth Meeting of the Special 
Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention, held 
in 2006, the Swiss delegation introduced Working Document No. 2. 
Article 7 of that document, entitled “Return and best interest of the 
child,” would allow a court to refuse to return a child if the following 
criteria were met: 
(1) the placement with the applicant is manifestly not in the best 
interest of the child, (2) the [abducting parent] cannot care for 
the child in the child’s habitual residence (or cannot reasonably be 
required to do so), and (3) the placement in foster care is 
manifestly not in the best interest of the child.21
Despite vigorous advocacy by the Swiss, the proposal was rejected:  
“A clear majority of experts indicated that the Swiss proposal to 
amend the Convention, while raising important and timely issues for 
debate, should not be accepted.”22
The Swiss proposal probably failed because of the language used to 
frame the new provision.  By describing the amendment as an 
application of the “best interest” principle,23 as its title suggested, the 
 
 20. Switzerland proposed these changes because of “[s]everal distressing cases” 
that occurred in Switzerland.  Special Comm’n on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child 
Abduction, Working Doc. No. 1E, at 3 (2006) [hereinafter Working Doc. No. 1E]; see 
also Bucher, supra note 2, at 139–42 (describing the specific cases that Switzerland 
found distressing). 
 21. Special Comm’n on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, Working Doc. 
No. 2E, art. 7 (2006) [hereinafter Working Doc. No. 2E]. This was a refinement of 
Switzerland’s initial proposal, found in item 5 of Working Document 1.  See Working 
Doc. No. 1E, supra note 20, item 5. 
 22. Hague Conference on Private International Law, October 30–November 9, 
2006, Report on the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the 
Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
and the Practical Implementation of the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental 
Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, at 45, ¶ 163 (Mar. 2007) 
[hereinafter Report on the Fifth Meeting]. 
 23. The Swiss argued that this change was timely, given the worldwide adoption 
of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and “of the prominence given to 
the overriding interests of the child in everything that concerns it.”  Working Doc. 
No. 1E, supra note 20, at Remarks:  Point 5.  Article 3(1) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child states:  “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken 
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”  Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex art. 
3(1), U.N. Doc.A/Res/44/25 (Dec. 12, 1989), available at http://www.cirp.org/ 
library/ethics/UN-convention.  The Swiss also identified the issue that was to be 
addressed as follows:  “Amending Art. 13, clause (b) so as to clarify the relationship 
between the principle of returning the abducted child and the interests of the child.”  
Working Doc. 1E, supra note 20, at Point 5. 
  
340 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:335 
                                                
provision looked as if it were the first step to a broader defense that 
would potentially excuse return whenever the best interest of the 
child required it.24  In fact, the Swiss believe that decisions from the 
European Court of Human Rights require consideration of the 
child’s best interest in all cases.25  The United States opposed the 
proposal, noting that the best interest of the child is typically 
achieved by returning the child.26
Although Working Document No. 2 was not adopted, Switzerland 
is to be commended for bringing the Wood case and other 
problematic fact patterns to the world’s attention.  The Swiss 
demonstrated that the Hague Convention defenses are interpreted 
too narrowly in various scenarios, resulting in harsh outcomes for the 
children involved.  These scenarios typically involve abductions by 
primary caretakers.27  Some of these abductions occur in order for the 
abductor to escape family violence,28 and courts sometimes return the 
child even though the primary custodian cannot safely return with 
the child.29  Some of these children end up in foster care30 or with the 
 
 24. See Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 22, at 46, ¶ 165 (noting that “[a] 
majority of experts . . . cautioned that the Swiss proposal created an additional 
ground for refusal, which would undermine the principle of comity by inviting courts 
in requested States to examine the best interests of the child”). 
 25. Bucher, supra note 2, at 156–57 & n.32. 
 26. Notes of Proceedings, supra note 19. 
 27. Merle H. Weiner, Half-Truths, Mistakes, and Embarrassments:  The United States 
Goes to the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 221, 
222–23 (2008) (indicating that 68% of the taking persons were primary or joint 
caregivers (citing A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2003 Under the Hague 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, infra note 247, at 
21–23)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Courts have not yet embraced the idea that Article 20 of the Convention 
affords a defense to return in these cases either.  I have argued elsewhere that it is a 
violation of Article 20 to make a domestic violence victim litigate custody in a venue 
where her safety is at risk.  See Merle H. Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, 38 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 701, 702 (2004) (arguing that Article 20 should be strengthened to allow the 
Hague Convention to operate more justly for domestic violence victims who flee 
transnationally with their children to escape domestic violence); Merle H. Weiner, 
Using Article 20, 38 FAM. L.Q. 583, 583–84 (2004) (detailing the aspects of an Article 
20 defense that a domestic violence victim might make when responding to a Hague 
petition in the United States).  Article 20 permits an assessment of whether return 
violates the human rights of any individual.  See Hague Abduction Convention, supra 
note 1, art. 20 (“The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be 
refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the 
requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Adan v. Avans, No. 04-55155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *4 
(D.N.J. July 30, 2007) (arranging with Argentinean authorities for the child to enter 
foster care; case involved allegations of domestic violence and child sexual abuse), 
rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008); In re L.L., (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 22, 2000) 
reported at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0273.htm (holding that an Article 
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petitioner (the alleged abuser).  In other cases,  serious and credible 
child abuse allegations are made against the left-behind parent, but 
the court in the abducted-to nation returns the child anyway, 
believing that foster care in the child’s habitual residence is an 
appropriate placement until the allegations are resolved.  In yet other 
cases, the petitioner only has rights of visitation, or only seeks to 
establish visitation, but the court returns the child anyway,31 even 
though the primary caretaker may not, or cannot, return with the 
child.  The primary caretaker’s reasons for not returning are varied, 
but may include an expired passport, an improper immigration 
status, the prospect of being criminally prosecuted upon return, fear 
of the petitioner, or an unwillingness to leave a full life in the 
abducted-to state.  Switzerland succeeded in pointing out the 
limitations of the Convention and its defenses, as currently 
interpreted, in these types of situations. 
In the context of Switzerland’s attempt to expand the 
understanding of the Article 13(b) defense, Mr. J. David McClean, a 
delegate for the Commonwealth Secretariat who was present at the 
Convention’s drafting, provided background for the words 
“intolerable situation” in Article 13(b).32  He “indicated that the 
 
13(b) “grave risk” defense was not established, despite the fact that it was “highly 
likely that . . . [the father] engaged in a pattern of excessive corporal punishment 
with respect to all three children and domestic violence towards their mother,” 
because the Dutch Child Protection Board intended to place the children in foster 
care pending an investigation upon their return); see also Nunez Escudero v. Tice-
Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that a baby’s possible 
institutionalization during the pendency of the Mexican custody proceedings could 
eradicate a grave risk of harm).  Sometimes children are placed in foster care in the 
United States pending the adjudication of the Hague petition, as were the children 
in the Wood case.  See, e.g., Arguelles v. Vazquez, No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 WL 913325, at 
*6 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 2008) (indicating seven-year-old child was in protective custody 
and social worker indicated child was “closely bonded to her mother [the 
Respondent] and . . . the more expeditiously [the child] could return to a normal 
structured day-to-day existence, the better”). 
 31. Although the Convention clearly does not permit the remedy of return for 
those petitioners who only have rights of access, a number of courts around the 
world have held that the remedy applies if the right of access is coupled with a ne 
exeat clause prohibiting the child’s removal from the jurisdiction without the 
permission of the court or the other parent.  There is a split among U.S. courts on 
this issue.  Compare Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding 
“that a ne exeat clause does not transmute access rights into rights of custody under 
the Convention”), and Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(same), and Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000), with Furnes v. Reeves, 
362 F.3d 702, 716 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that under Norwegian law the ne exeat 
clause is a right to custody under the Convention because of a broad definition of 
custody that includes “the right to determine the child’s place of residence”), and 
Croll, 229 F.3d at 150–53 (Sotomayer, J., dissenting) (citing foreign countries that 
believe a ne exeat clause creates a right of custody). 
 32. Notes of Proceedings, supra note 19. 
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words ‘intolerable situation’ in Article 13(b) were meant to be a 
flexible concept that could address many of the harder cases.”33  In 
particular, he explained that the phrase “intolerable situation” was 
added to the 1980 Convention to deal with exceptional cases where a 
court could not find a grave risk of harm to the child, but returning 
the child would have been absurd as a procedural matter.  He further 
explained that the provision was prompted by a case in which a 
United Kingdom court was asked to return a child to California, even 
though everyone recognized that the California court would certainly 
allow the child’s relocation to the United Kingdom.34
The notes of the drafting session suggest that Mr. McClean’s 
description is accurate.  A U.K. delegate stated: 
[I]t was necessary to add the words “or otherwise place the child in 
an intolerable situation” since there were many situations not 
covered by the concept of “physical and psychological harm.”  For 
example, where one spouse was subject to threats and violence at 
the hands of the other and forced to flee the matrimonial home, it 
could be argued that the child suffered no physical or 
psychological harm, although it was clearly exposed to an 
intolerable situation.35
This history has been largely ignored and has led to problems in the 
implementation of the Convention.36
The conversation at the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission 
breathed life into the term “intolerable situation.”  A report 
summarizing the proceedings noted that the experts “emphasi[z]ed 
the concept of an ‘intolerable situation[,]’ which was included in 
 
 33. Weiner, supra note 27, at 292–93 (citing Notes of Proceedings, supra note 
19). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Procès-verbal No 8, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION—
CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ—ENLÈVEMENT D’ENFANTS 
297, 302 (1982) (reporting the statement of Mr. Jones of the United Kingdom from 
the meeting of Tuesday morning, October 14, 1980).  Mr. Leal of Canada thought 
that “the meeting should not concern itself unduly with such situations [as Mr. Jones 
described].  Social workers tended to take different views at different times 
concerning the rights and wrongs in these matters.”  Id.; see also Shireen Fisher, How 
Far Did the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission 
Advance the Interpretation of Article 13(1)(b), Grave Risk Defence?, XII The JUDGES’ NEWSL. 
54, 56, 58 (2007) (citing both Mr. Jones’ statement in Procès-verbal No 8 from the 
meeting of Tuesday morning, October 14, 1980, and Mr. Leal’s response).  Judge 
Fisher astutely points out how much progress has been made in understanding 
domestic violence since Mr. Leal’s remarks.  Id. at 58. 
 36. See generally Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and 
Their Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529, 541–42 
(2004) (arguing that return orders in cases of domestic violence pose extremely 
grave risks because the incidence and severity of abuse increase after the victim tries 
to separate from his or her abuser, despite a judge’s efforts or promises to protect 
the child or partner). 
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Article 13 of the Convention to address those situations where the 
return of a child would not necessarily create a grave risk, but where 
it would still be inappropriate to order the return.”37  Consequently, 
although the delegates decided not to formally expand Article 13(b) 
to address these hard cases,38 “[e]ven Switzerland was eventually 
satisfied that the difficult cases could be resolved on the basis of the 
current text, and that the case law could develop adequately to 
address these situations.”39
After the Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission, Switzerland 
took unilateral action to ensure that “intolerable situation” would, in 
fact, cover future situations like the Wood case, at least in Swiss 
courts.40  On December 21, 2007, the Swiss Parliament passed a law 
that says an “intolerable situation” exists for purposes of Article 13(b) 
when, but not only when, the following criteria are met: 
a. placement with the parent who filed the application is manifestly 
not in the child’s best interests; 
b. the abducting parent is not, given all of the circumstances, in a 
position to take care of the child in the State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the abduction or if this 
cannot reasonably be required from this parent; and 
c. placement in foster care is manifestly not in the child’s best 
interests.41
 
 37. Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra note 22, ¶ 166. 
 38. The Fifth Meeting of the Special Commission to Review Operation of the 
Convention indicated that the Commission “reaffirms Recommendation 4.3 of the 
2001 meeting of the Special Commission:  The Article 13, paragraph 1b), ‘grave risk’ 
defen[s]e has generally been narrowly construed by courts in the Contracting States, 
and this is confirmed by the relatively small number of return applications which 
were refused on this basis.”  See Hague Conference on Private International Law, 
October 30–November 9, 2006, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting of 
the Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Practical Implementation of the 
Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, 
Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the 
Protection of Children, § 1.4.2 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the Fifth Meeting]. 
 39. Weiner, supra note 27, at 293. 
 40. Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 (2008), 
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, supra 
note 2, at 162.  Switzerland also presented another version of its proposal, in the 
form of a draft Protocol, to the Permanent Bureau.  The Council on General Affairs 
and Policy, in April 2008, reserved for “future consideration of the feasibility of a 
Protocol containing auxiliary rules designed to improve the operation of the 
Convention.”  See Bucher, supra note 2, at 145. 
 41. Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 (2008), 
available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, supra 
note 2, at 162. 
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The new Swiss Act has other important articles,42 but most notable 
are the provisions that emphasize the child’s autonomy and 
independent interest in the proceedings.  For example, the Swiss Act 
ensures representation for the child.  Article 9 states, “The court shall 
order that the child be represented and designate as a representative 
a person experienced in welfare and legal matters. This person may 
file applications and lodge appeals.”43  The Act also requires the court 
to “hear the child in an appropriate manner or appoint an expert to 
carry out this hearing unless the age of the child or another valid 
reason prevents this.”44  These provisions make concrete for all cases 
in Swiss courts, not just those involving European Union members, 
the requirement in Brussels II bis45 that whenever an Article 12 or 13 
defense is raised, “it shall be ensured that the child is given the 
opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless this appears 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of 
maturity.”46
The Swiss Act serves as a concrete reminder that States can 
minimize the negative consequences that the Hague Abduction 
Convention creates for particular children.  The Swiss legislation 
should reduce the number of children negatively impacted, and it 
does so within the spirit and framework of the Convention.  The 
Article now discusses the doctrinal and practical significance of these 
reforms for litigants in the United States, assuming courts in the 
United States were willing to incorporate these Swiss ideas into U.S. 
law and practice. 
 
 42. The Swiss law has some other interesting provisions, although a discussion of 
those provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.  For example, the Swiss Act gives 
considerable direction about the handling of these cases and wisely recommends 
that the Central Authority involve specialists with multidisciplinary knowledge to 
assist the family in reaching a voluntary resolution, employing conciliation and 
mediation if necessary.  See Swiss Federal Act arts. 3, 4, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale 
suisse [FF] 35 (2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, 
translated in Bucher, supra note 2, at 162 (setting forth the instructions for the 
establishment of a network of experts and institutions to assist in conciliation and 
mediation); Bucher, supra note 2, at 145–46 (arguing that the use of experts and 
specialists will increase the number of harmonious resolutions that will better reflect 
the child’s best interest). 
 43. Swiss Federal Act art. 9(3), Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 37 
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, 
supra note 2, at 163. 
 44. Id. art. 9(2). 
 45. Council Regulation 2201/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC) (“Brussels II bis”), 
available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:338: 
0001:0029:EN:PDF. 
 46. Id. at 6, ch. 2, art. 11(2).  
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II. INTOLERABLE SITUATION 
Courts in the United States should recognize that “intolerable 
situation” is a separate defense to the Convention’s remedy of return, 
and accept the Swiss formulation as a good articulation of one type of 
“intolerable situation.”47
A. The Conflation of Intolerable Situation and Grave Risk of Harm 
Courts in the United States have given virtually no attention to the 
term “intolerable situation.”  A close review of cases in the United 
States decided since the beginning of 2006 and a summary review of 
older cases indicate that courts routinely analyze facts only under the 
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” standard in Article 
13(b). Courts either ignore the “intolerable situation” language or 
assume it is coextensive with the “grave risk of harm” language.48  
Courts in other countries sometimes exhibit a similar imprecision.49  
Such an interpretation is clearly wrong since the language of the 
provision plainly says that return is not required if “there is a grave 
 
 47. Courts in the United States could adopt the Swiss interpretation of the 
Convention in a manner that was consistent with the approach U.S. courts take to 
treaty interpretation.  See generally Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between 
Uniformity and Progress:  The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 296–98 
(2002) (arguing that the variety and flexibility of approaches to treaty interpretation 
in the U.S. permit consideration of subsequent practice by treaty partners). 
 48. See, e.g., Diallo v. Bekemeyer, No. 4:07CV1125SNL, 2007 WL 4593502, at *11 
(E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007) (analyzing solely under Article 13(b)’s grave risk of harm 
provision “hotly disputed” testimony about domestic violence and evidence about 
stress in couple’s relationship due to petitioner’s marijuana use); Van Driessch v. 
Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 841 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (naming only two 
defenses to a wrongful removal claim in case where there were allegations of 
domestic violence and drinking problems by the father:  a grave risk of physical or 
psychological harm and a violation of principles relating to the protection of human 
rights or freedoms); Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing 
district court’s grant of the Article 13(b) defense based upon the environment in 
Australia being intolerable, finding the facts did not show grave risk of harm); 
Blondin v. Dubois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated on separate 
grounds, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that return of children would violate 
Article 13(b), in part, because children were well-settled in the United States, and a 
return to France would cause mother and children to live with father, thereby 
presenting a grave risk of psychological harm or an intolerable situation without 
distinguishing between the two).  But see In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 155 Cal. 
App. 4th 963, 967, 974 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (recognizing return of children to 
Germany, where they would either be in protective custody or in the custody of an 
allegedly suicidal mother with an alleged history of drinking and mental health 
issues, might be an “intolerable situation” in addition to a “grave risk of harm”).   
 49. See NIGEL LOWE, MARK EVERALL QC & MICHAEL NICHOLLS, INTERNATIONAL 
MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN:  LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 330 (2004) (“Although the 
‘grave risk’ relates to the separate components, namely, physical harm, psychological 
harm and placing the child in an intolerable situation, in practice they are rarely 
pleaded or treated as distinct exceptions.”). 
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risk that [the child’s] return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”50
The aggregation of the discrete concepts in the United States is 
probably attributable to a report by the U.S. State Department 
prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.51  This 
report conflated the two provisions in Article 13(b) by using child 
sexual abuse as the example of an “intolerable situation.”52  Since 
child sexual abuse also poses a “grave risk of physical and 
psychological harm” to the child, the two concepts were made to look 
coterminous.  The State Department said: 
“[I]ntolerable situation” was not intended to encompass return to a 
home where money is in short supply, or where educational or 
other opportunities are more limited than in the requested State.  
An example of an “intolerable situation” is one in which a custodial 
parent sexually abuses the child.  If the other parent removes or 
retains the child to safeguard [him or her] against further 
victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child’s 
return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition.  
Such action would protect the child from being returned to an 
“intolerable situation” and subjected to a grave risk of 
psychological harm.53
Although the State Department’s example might cause courts to 
assume “intolerable situation” and “grave risk of physical or 
psychological harm” are co-extensive, this interpretation is not 
required by the State Department’s report.  The report does not say 
that a “grave risk of physical or psychological harm” is required for an 
“intolerable situation,” or that child sexual abuse is the only type of 
“intolerable situation.”  Rather, the language only suggests that the 
drafters believed a “grave risk of physical or psychological harm” was 
an “intolerable situation.”  It would be incorrect to assume that a 
“grave risk of physical or psychological harm” is required for an 
“intolerable situation,” given the words “or otherwise” in the 
provision and the legislative history from the drafting of the 
Convention. 
 
 50. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 13 (emphasis added). 
 51. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis]. 
 52. Id. at 10510. 
 53. Id. 
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The State Department’s analysis is generally persuasive authority,54 
and its report has been cited in numerous judicial opinions that 
blend the two exceptions together.55  For example, in Blondin v. 
Dubois,56 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited the 
State Department’s report when discussing the “grave risk of harm” 
language, not the “intolerable situation” language.57  It said: 
[A]t one end of the spectrum are those situations where 
repatriation might cause inconvenience or hardship, eliminate 
certain educational or economic opportunities, or not comport 
with the child’s preferences; at the other end of the spectrum are 
those situations in which the child faces a real risk of being hurt, 
physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation.  The 
former do not constitute a grave risk of harm under Article 13b; 
the latter do.58
In developing a spectrum for the “grave risk of harm” defense, the 
Second Circuit chose examples for one endpoint that had little, if 
any, connection to physical or psychological harm.  Rather, these 
examples were offered during the Convention’s drafting,59 and were 
reiterated in the State Department report, to show situations that 
would not qualify as an “intolerable situation.”  The Second Circuit’s 
conflation of the concepts did not affect its analysis in Blondin of 
 
 54. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
although the State Department’s analysis is not binding, it is entitled to deference 
(citing Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 373 n.7 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
 55. A search on Westlaw “allcases” database found eighteen cases that cited the 
Report’s language, in whole or in part (search conducted July 21, 2008 for the 
following:  Intolerable w/s situation and “money is in short supply” and Hague). 
 56. 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 57. Id. at 162. 
 58. Id. 
 59. The reference to economic or educational disadvantage first appeared in a 
report by the Special Commission that led to the initial drafting of a convention.  See 
Elisa Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA 
QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—
ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 173, 203, ¶ 97 (1982) [hereinafter Pérez-Vera, Report of the 
Special Commission].  A proposal by the U.S. delegation to tighten the Article 13(b) 
defense reiterated the reference.  See Procès-verbal No 2, 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA 
QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—
ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 257, 263, at No. 12 (1982).  While delegates agreed that 
economic and educational disadvantage should not trigger the defense, see, e.g., id. at 
301 (noting the comment of Mr. Holub from the Czechoslovakia delegation), the 
U.S. proposal was nonetheless overwhelmingly defeated by a vote of 19 to 5, with  
2 abstentions.  See id.  The Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report explains that it would be 
wrong to infer from the rejection of the U.S. proposal that the exceptions should 
receive a wide interpretation.  See Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, 3 ACTES ET 
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIEME SESSION—CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE—ENLEVEMENT D’ENFANTS 426, 461, at ¶ 116 (1982) [hereinafter 
Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report]. 
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whether the child there faced a grave risk of harm,60 but it 
contributed to the invisibility of the “intolerable situation” defense. 
This invisibility has substantive implications for other cases. 
B. The Substantive Implications of Disaggregating the Concepts 
The failure to disaggregate the “grave risk of harm” and 
“intolerable situation” defenses in Article 13(b) has unnecessarily 
limited the scope of the “intolerable situation” defense.  Most 
obviously, something may create an “intolerable situation” for the 
child, yet not cause the child a “grave risk of physical or psychological 
harm.”61  The separation of siblings is arguably such a situation.62  
 
 60. An expert testified about the serious psychological harm the children might 
experience if they were returned to France, regardless of the French government’s 
ability to protect the children from violence.  Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163.  These were 
facts that “belong on the latter end of the spectrum.”  Id. at 162. 
 61. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 151-54 (1998) (citing cases where the return of a 
child might not cause a “grave risk of harm,” yet still might meet the “intolerable 
situation” defense). 
 Some courts have read the provisions together to inform their view of what 
constitutes a “grave risk of harm.”  These courts have said that the “grave risk of 
physical or psychological harm” must rise to a fairly serious level to be relevant.  See, 
e.g., Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1260–61 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing 
Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 119 D.L.R.4th 253, 286 (Can.) (explaining “otherwise” 
means that the harm must be “to a degree that also amounts to an intolerable 
situation”)); Re A (A Minor) (Abduction), (1988) 1 Fam. 365, 372 (C.A.) (U.K.) 
(upholding judge’s order that returned child and holding that the risk of 
psychological harm must be “weighty” and the potential harm “substantial, and not 
trivial,” which was supported by the words “or otherwise place the child in an 
intolerable situation”). 
 This Article takes no position on whether this interpretation is correct or not.  It 
certainly can be argued that the framers viewed any level of certain harm to a child 
to be sufficient to invoke the defense.  It would have been easy enough to add the 
words “serious” or “life-threatening” before “physical or psychological harm,” which 
was not done.  In fact, a restrictive interpretation arguably contradicts the Pérez-Vera 
report because the report says, without qualifying the type of harm or including the 
word “otherwise,” that the Convention’s remedy “gives way before the primary 
interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or 
being placed in an intolerable situation.”  See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra 
note 59, at 433, ¶ 29. 
 62. See Re T (Abduction:  Child’s Objections to Return), [2000] 2 Fam. 192, 192–
93 (C.A.) (U.K.) (holding that the younger child of two siblings should not be 
returned to Spain alone because this would place the younger child in an 
“intolerable situation” given that “the two children had been through difficult times 
together; the younger child had been dependent on his sister and she had acted as 
his ‘little mother’ at times”); Cour de la Cassation [Cass. 6e civ.] [highest court of 
ordinary jurisdiction], June 22, 1999, Bull. Civ. 1999,  N 209, M. Lemontey (Fr.). But 
see Raijmakers-Eghaghe v. Haro, 131 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (E.D. Mich. 2001) 
(expressing reluctance to separate siblings, but ordering one child’s return pending 
determination of other child’s maturity defense, although the respondent may not 
have argued that separation of the siblings would be an intolerable situation); In re 
L.L., (N.Y. Fam. Ct. May 22, 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/ 
fullcase/0273.htm (holding that the separation of an older child, who had reached 
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Similarly, removing a child from the child’s primary caretaker and 
placing the child in foster care pending the resolution of a custody 
dispute may be an “intolerable situation,” even though the 
arrangement may not pose a “grave risk of harm” to the child.  
Sending a child back to a war zone perhaps qualifies as another such 
example.63  Imposing unnecessary and burdensome travel and 
litigation expenses on the family, when the court knows the abductor 
and child will ultimately be allowed to relocate, might also qualify.64  
These examples demonstrate that the scope of Article 13(b) is 
broader than merely “grave risk of harm.” 
Analyzing “intolerable situation” separately from “grave risk of 
harm” has another important substantive effect.  It actually changes 
the likelihood that an Article 13(b) defense will be successful when 
the respondent argues that return will pose a “grave risk of harm.”  
For a successful “grave risk of harm” defense, many courts now 
require both a grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the 
child and a lack of ameliorative measures that might reduce the risk 
associated with return.65  Ameliorative measures can include 
undertakings by the left-behind parent, or assurances by the central 
authority or a court in the child’s habitual residence.66  Many judges 
consider ameliorative measures as part of the defense, although this 
judicially created amendment to Article 13(b) is now coming under 
 
maturity, from two other children did not pose an intolerable situation for the 
younger children should they be returned to their father). 
 63. Cf. Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 900-01 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding 
Article 13(b) defense was not established since Israel is not a “zone of war” and the 
mother offered insufficient proof of how the fighting would directly put the children 
at grave risk of harm); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(saying, in dicta, that the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” would be made out if 
child is in imminent danger prior to resolution of the custody dispute because the 
requesting state is a war zone).  But cf. Freier v. Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 443 (E.D. 
Mich. 1996) (holding Article 13(b) defense was not established since Israel is not a 
“zone of war” because, in part, the city where the children lived was free from 
fighting, and businesses and schools are open).   
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 32–34. 
 65. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248–49 (2d Cir. 1999) (remanding 
the case to the district court to consider the availability of all possible ameliorative 
measures that could reduce the risk of harm from the child’s repatriation, not just 
those requested in the petition). 
 66. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 n.11 (2d Cir. 2001).  Some 
courts believe that even if the court in the requesting state can give the child 
adequate protection, the court in the requested state must explore ameliorative 
measures in order to reduce the risk attending return.  See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 
397 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that even though Argentina’s ability to provide 
protection was not in question, when ordering the return of a child to Argentina, the 
court should carefully tailor the order to include specific protections to ameliorate 
the risk of harm since the Argentinean authorities might not act immediately, 
including specifying in whose custody the child should be returned). 
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considerable criticism by some courts.67  Where the requirement 
exists, it creates a tremendous obstacle for respondents.  It is difficult 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that another jurisdiction 
cannot, or will not, protect a child, especially if the jurisdiction has a 
foster care system.  However, this obstacle becomes less formidable if 
the “intolerable situation” defense is considered along with the “grave 
risk of harm” defense.  After all, the availability of foster care should 
not be an acceptable way to defeat the “grave risk of harm” defense if 
foster care itself poses an “intolerable situation” for the child.  It is 
illogical to allow an “intolerable situation” to defeat the “grave risk of 
harm” defense. 
The “intolerable situation” language also has another substantive 
implication for courts considering whether to return a child.  The 
language heightens the importance of broad comprehensive 
undertakings.  Undertakings have been used to mitigate “grave risks 
of physical or psychological harm.”68 The U.S. State Department is 
currently trying to reign in courts’ use of undertakings by suggesting 
that undertakings have become too broad in scope and too 
common.69  Yet broad and liberal undertakings appear entirely 
proper when one focuses on “intolerable situation,” and not simply 
“grave risk of harm.”  Judge Singer’s opinion in the English case of Re 
O (Child Abduction: Undertakings) illustrates the appropriateness of the 
approach.70  As to the “intolerable situation,” he stated: 
In this case the children would find themselves in an intolerable 
situation if upon their return to Greece they were for any 
appreciable period to find themselves deprived of the continuity of 
 
 67. There are many problems with the judicially created amendments to Article 
13(b).  Most notably, a judge might have difficulty determining whether the state of 
habitual residence can adequately address a risk because the law on the books is 
often different than the law as applied.  See, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346–
48 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to require that the responding parent demonstrate 
that the “child’s country of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to ameliorate 
the grave risk of harm which would otherwise accompany the child’s return” because 
the requirement is difficult to prove and was not contemplated by the Convention); 
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 57–71 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
the rendering court must determine “that the children will in fact, and not just in 
legal theory, be protected if returned” to the abusing parent’s custody).  In addition, 
protections may at times be inadequate because the harm stems from the children’s 
fear of return, regardless of the actual protections that exist.  See, e.g., Danaipour v. 
McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 303–04 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that returning the children 
to Sweden would definitely result in psychological harm to the children, “regardless 
of any possible conditions or undertakings imposed”); Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163 n.11 
(finding that “the authorities, through no fault of their own, may not be able to give 
the children adequate protection”). 
 68. Weiner, supra note 27, at 295. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Re O (Child Abduction:  Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 362 (U.K.). 
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day-to-day care hitherto afforded them by their mother.  So would 
it be if they returned to live in a home shared contrary to her 
wishes by the father, or visited by him irrespective of her 
opposition.  And whereas for many families’ financial constraints 
are inevitable . . . , were these children to be subject to a situation 
where the resources to finance their customary lifestyle risk being 
cut off, that would constitute a situation of hardship severe enough 
in the context of their experience to be described as intolerable.  
So would it be for them if their mother was unable effectively to 
function as their carer, as for instance if she were subject to the 
type of extreme emotional bombardment to which marital 
disharmony sometimes leads, or if she were subjected to penal 
sanction or civil penalty for her actions initially in removing the 
children wrongfully, or for the manner in which subsequently she 
had resisted an order for their return in these courts.  In the local 
and social isolation in which the mother would find herself, so 
seemingly humdrum a facility as the use or the withholding of a car 
might well represent for the children, because of its direct and 
indirect impact on their daily lives, the difference between a 
tolerable situation and one that was not.71
To mitigate the grave risk of an intolerable situation that would 
have existed if the children were returned, Judge Singer insisted 
upon undertakings that would operate until a Greek court became 
seized of the matter.72  The father agreed to extensive undertakings, 
including not to remove or seek to remove the children from the 
mother’s care and control, to provide a car for the mother and to pay 
for the costs of its operation, to provide an apartment for the sole 
occupation of the mother and children, to pay all the children’s 
school fees, and to pay the medical costs of the mother and children.  
Further undertakings included agreeing to pay for the mother’s and 
children’s return, not to institute or support any proceeding for the 
punishment of the mother related to the children’s removal 
(whether criminal or civil), to pay the mother’s maintenance, to pay 
the mother’s reasonable legal costs for proceedings in Greece, and 
not to pester her.73  After finding that these undertakings would be 
honored, or at least given some effect by the Greek courts if not 
honored, Judge Singer held that these undertakings alleviated the 
 
 71. Id. at 349. 
 72. See id. at 362. 
 73. Id. at 354; cf. Pantazatou v. Pantazatos, No. FA 96713571, 1997 WL 614572, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1997) (imposing broad undertakings so mother could 
return to Greece with child and so child would not suffer psychological harm from 
separation). 
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risk that the children would find themselves in an “intolerable 
situation.”74
C. The Scope of an Intolerable Situation Defense 
Before turning to the specifics of the Swiss proposal, it is helpful to 
think about the scope of the “intolerable situation” defense.  After all, 
Judge Singer’s description of what would be intolerable, broad as it 
was, deserves some exploration.  Moreover, one can only evaluate the 
Swiss proposal’s consistency with the Convention by understanding 
the scope of “intolerable situation” more generally. 
“Intolerable situation” is not defined in the Convention, but the 
words “grave risk” and “intolerable” suggest that the defense is 
narrow.75  The drafting history reveals that the phrase “intolerable 
situation” was supposed to evoke an objective sense that return was 
unwarranted.76  The Special Commission rejected the word 
“unacceptable,” believing that an “unacceptable” situation required a 
highly subjective assessment.77
“Intolerable” is commonly understood to mean unbearable.  The 
Oxford English Dictionary states that “intolerable” means “cannot be 
tolerated, borne, or put up with; unendurable, unbearable, 
insupportable, insufferable.”78  Its looser meaning is “[e]xcessive, 
extreme, exceedingly great.”79  Adopting what appears to be a 
combination of both the stricter and the looser meanings of the 
word, the Court of Appeal for Ontario defined “intolerable” as “an 
extreme situation, a situation that is unbearable; a situation too 
severe to be endured.”80
The child’s perspective may be relevant to an assessment of 
whether the defense exists, but the child need not believe a situation 
 
 74. Re O, (1994) 2 Fam. at 372. 
 75. This is confirmed by the Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report, which calls for all 
the defenses to be interpreted in a “restrictive fashion.”  Pérez-Vera, Explanatory 
Report, supra note 59, at 434, ¶ 34. 
 76. Id. ¶ 33. 
 77. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 203, ¶ 97 
(noting that the Special Commission “had in mind an objective case” and rejected 
replacing the word “intolerable” with “unacceptable” “because this latter word 
comprises an element of subjective evaluation which had to be avoided”).   
 78. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 10 (2d ed. 1989). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Jabbaz v. Mouammar, [2003] 171 O.A.C. 102, 109 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.); see 
also In re D (A Child) (Abduction:  Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 
A.C. 619, 639 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (“‘Intolerable’ is a strong 
word, but when applied to a child must mean ‘a situation which this particular child 
in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate.’”). 
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is intolerable for it to be so.81  A child may be unaware of, or not care 
about, grave risks that adults would agree exposed the child to an 
“intolerable situation.”  Cases involving an infant, for example, might 
fall into this category.  Nor is the child’s view that something is 
intolerable determinative; a child may find an experience 
“intolerable” even though reasonable adults would disagree.82  For 
example, the child may find it unbearable to leave a school where the 
child has developed many close friends, although adults might 
conclude that the benefits of departure outweigh the disadvantages 
and that the child’s angst will be transitory.  Yet, at some point, the 
child’s views, even if initially unconvincing to reasonable adults, may 
change the adults’ views.  The duration and depth of the child’s 
unhappiness (or likely unhappiness) should cause a reassessment of 
whether the situation is, in fact, intolerable.  Few adults can stand to 
see a child in utter despair.  This objective approach, which takes 
account of the child’s feelings without making them determinative, 
aligns with the drafters’ desire to protect individual children from 
intolerable situations while at the same time limiting the breadth of 
the defense. 
A situation can be physically, mentally, or morally “intolerable.”83  It 
seems likely that the “intolerable situation” defense encompasses a 
morally intolerable situation.  After all, the “grave risk of harm” 
provision already addresses physical and mental harm to a child, and 
“intolerable situation” would be surplusage if its meaning were the 
same as “grave risk of physical or psychological harm.”84  In addition, 
the Special Commission that proposed the Convention “intended 
[the term psychological harm] to cover both the mental harm and a 
certain aspect of the moral harm, but it . . . knowingly avoided the 
latter expression which is too vague and which could even be 
interpreted as encompassing religious convictions.”85  The same 
intention likely also exists with respect to the phrase “intolerable 
situation,” if for no other reason than moral harm fits equally well, if 
not better, with that defense than with the defense of psychological 
harm. 
 
 81. Cf. In re D, [2007] 1 A.C. at 641–43 (discussing the importance of listening to 
children and describing the difference between taking account of a child’s view and 
doing what the child wants). 
 82. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 83. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 10 (2d ed. 1989). 
 84. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.6, at 
230–31, 237 (7th ed. 2007) (provisions in a statute should be interpreted so as not to 
render any of the terms surplusage). 
 85. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 203. 
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Examples given by the drafters, as well as subsequent case law, also 
support the conclusion that an “intolerable situation” is a morally 
intolerable situation.  The fact patterns that give rise to the claim of 
an “intolerable situation” are all broadly similar:  the benefits of 
return seem dubious for a particular child.  Yet the outcomes vary 
depending upon the type, degree, and likelihood of suffering the 
child might experience.  For example, “the Special Commission 
thought that the exception would not apply if the child’s return was 
thought to be prejudicial to his economic or educational future.”86  
An Ontario appellate court held that a left-behind mother’s 
uncertain immigration status in the United States did not make the 
return of the child to the United States an “intolerable situation,” 
especially since she would only be deported, if at all, to Canada.87  On 
the other hand, an Israeli court held that the inability of a mother to 
support her children in the child’s habitual residence placed them in 
an “intolerable situation.”88  A court in England ruled similarly.89  The 
cases reflect an assessment of what sacrifices society can morally 
expect from an individual child for purposes of benefiting the greater 
good, e.g., generally deterring abduction.  This highly fact-dependent 
assessment is nothing more than a question of morality with a 
 
 86. Id. at 203, ¶ 97. 
 87. Jabbaz v. Mouammar, [2003] 171 O.A.C. 102, 110 (Ont. Ct. App.) (Can.). 
 88. Family Appeal 621/04, D.Y. v. D.R., in The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006, Collated Responses to the 
Questionnaire Concerning the Practical Operation of the Hague Convention of 25 October 
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Prelim. Doc. No. 2 , at 200 
(Oct. 2006), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd02efs2006.pdf 
[hereinafter Collated Responses]. 
 89. In re J [Abduction:  Acquiring Custody Rights By Caring for Child], [2005] 2 
FLR 791.  The court in In re J found that the petitioner did not have rights of 
custody.  Id. ¶ 25.  In the alternative, the court held that returning the child would 
place the child in an intolerable situation.  Id. ¶ 30  Both parents were English, and 
returning the child to Greece would mean that the parties would be litigating in a 
foreign language that neither spoke fluently.  Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.  During the pendency of 
the Greek proceedings, which could take considerable time, the mother would live in 
Greece without “a degree of comfort.”  Id. ¶ 32.  The mother would probably have to 
rely upon social security, all the while unable to work to pay off a very large credit 
card debt because her housing would be remote and she would not have a workable 
car.  Id.  
There are other cases where the defense has been established.  One author 
reports, “[a] court in Ireland refused to return abducted children to their father 
because it felt that the father’s inability to manage money, which in turn caused the 
family’s eviction nine times, was an ‘intolerable situation.’  A French court refused to 
return a child to Los Angeles based on the belief that the environment is polluted 
and therefore dangerous to the child’s health.  Similarly, a German court refused 
return of children to England since German is not spoken in English schools or in 
the children’s home.”  Lisa Nakdai, Note, It’s 10 P.M., Do You Know Where Your 
Children Are?, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 251, 255  (2002) (citations omitted). 
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utilitarian emphasis.90  The “intolerable situation” defense is 
established at the point that the disadvantage faced by an individual 
child outweighs the potential benefits all children receive from 
deterring international abduction.  The drafters hoped to set a high 
enough threshold for intolerability so that observers would agree that 
the type and degree of hardship were not justified in a particular 
case.91
The Swiss formulation of “intolerable situation” identifies a 
situation that most observers would find morally intolerable.  It is a 
good formulation because the defense has as its centerpiece the 
requirement that the child will be separated from his or her primary 
caregiver, an event that is likely to be difficult, if not unbearable, for 
both the child and the parent, and that has identifiable risks for the 
child.92  Since placement with the left-behind parent also has to be 
manifestly not in the child’s best interest, the left-behind parent has 
less moral claim to the child’s return.  The abductor must also have a 
morally defensible reason for not returning with the child.  
Consequently, the Swiss formulation has intuitive appeal.  
Nonetheless, whether a grave risk of a morally “intolerable situation” 
exists ultimately depends upon the particular facts of the case, and it 
 
 90. Professor Graglia has a succinct and helpful description of utilitarian 
morality: 
The usual distinction is between a principle-based morality, as advocated by 
Immanuel Kant, and utilitarianism, a morality based on consequences. . . .  
Utilitarianism maintains that the rightness or wrongness of conduct depends 
on its consequences. To a secularist claiming no aid from the supernatural, 
the above assertion seems self-evident. How is it possible to judge an action 
except by its consequences? Kantian tradition answers by judging an action’s 
inherent justice or rightness, which should somehow be determined apart 
from and regardless of consequences. “Do justice,” the Kantian view advises, 
“though the heavens fall”—that is, do what is inherently right, even though it 
brings about an unimaginable disaster.  Surely that has to be wrong: If doing 
justice will bring about an unimaginable disaster, we must rethink our idea 
of justice. 
Lino A. Graglia, Government Promotion of Moral Issues:  Gambling, Smoking, and 
Advertising, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 69 (2008) (citation omitted). 
 91. In this sense, the defense differs from the rejected public policy defense 
because that defense relied solely on the public policy of the requested state.  
Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, supra note 29, at 708–10. 
 92. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, 
supra note 2, at 162–63 (outlining situations, such as placement in foster care, that 
are intolerable situations); cf. Carol Bruch, Sound Research or Wishful Thinking in Child 
Custody Cases?  Lessons for Relocation Law, 40 FAM. L.Q. 281, 285–86 (2006) (citing 
research indicating that a child’s relationship with his or her mother during infancy 
and early childhood significantly affects his or her ability to develop and sustain 
intimate relationships during the child’s lifetime).  See generally M. Rutter, Maternal 
Deprivation Reassessed, in IV CHILD WELFARE:  MAJOR THEMES IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 162 (Nick Frost ed., 2005) (canvassing issues and understandings since 
Bowlby’s 1951 review of the field). 
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is impossible to say categorically that all fact patterns satisfying the 
Swiss criteria should qualify for the defense.  For example, an 
assessment of moral intolerability may require determining whether 
the primary caretaker became such solely by virtue of the abduction. 
D. The Use of the Swiss Formulation for Hard Cases 
The benefit of the “intolerable situation” defense, and the Swiss 
formulation, is quite evident in one of those situations for which the 
Swiss law was designed.  It helps address the problem of primary 
caretakers who flee with their children to avoid domestic violence.  
These abductors sometimes have trouble defeating an application for 
their children’s return even though the courts acknowledge the 
violence in their lives.93  Some courts are unable to appreciate the 
connection between domestic violence against the parent and the 
physical and psychological well-being of the child.94  Other courts do 
not understand that a situation can be dangerous even if the physical 
violence is only “sporadic.”95  Fortunately, courts in the United States 
are becoming increasingly sensitive to the relevancy and sufficiency of 
 
 93. See Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic 
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 654–58 (2000) (noting cases in which violence 
against an adult was held not to create a “grave risk of harm” for a child and cases in 
which courts defer to the returning jurisdiction to provide adequate protection). 
 94. See id.; Merle H. Weiner, Strengthening Article 20, supra note 29, at 717–18; see, 
e.g.,  Laguna v. Avila, No. 07-CV-5136 (ENV), 2008 WL 1986253, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 
7, 2008) (stating that mother’s allegations that father was physically violent toward 
her and abused alcohol were irrelevant because there was no evidence that father 
ever abused child or was likely to do so); Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHX-
EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (finding allegations that parties 
had intense arguments and that father allegedly struck the mother, including once 
in front of their child, to be irrelevant to whether the children would be placed in an 
intolerable situation or face a grave risk of harm); Diallo v. Bekemeyer, No. 
4:07CV1125SNL, 2007 WL 4593502, at *11 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 2007) (finding 
contested evidence of domestic violence against the mother and evidence of stress in 
the relationship to be irrelevant to Article 13(b) because there was no evidence that 
petitioner directed any violence towards the children); Van Driessche v. Ohio-
Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 828, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (“[A]lthough Smith alleges Van 
Driessche was abusive to her, she does not allege he was abusive to [the child].”); In 
re A.V.P.G. and C.C.P.G., 251 S.W.3d 117, 128 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008)  (“Even with 
allegations of physical abuse to the spouse, grave risk is not proven when there is no 
evidence that the non-abducting party physically abused the children.”). 
 95. Some courts still discount domestic violence because it is “sporadic.”  See, e.g., 
Arguelles v. Vazquez, No. 08-2030-CM, 2008 WL 913325, at *13-*14 (D. Kan. Mar. 17, 
2008) (stating the child witnessing a few instances of violence not directed toward 
her did not place her at risk); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 & n.5 
(D. Mass. 2005) (noting that “[e]vidence of real but sporadic or isolated incidents of 
physical abuse, or of some limited incidents aimed at persons other than the child at 
issue, have not been found sufficient to support application of the ‘grave risk’ 
exception[,]” and  finding that respondent’s alleged violence “appears isolated and 
remote in time, and importantly, was allegedly directed at [the mother] and not the 
children who are the subject of the petition for return”). 
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domestic violence for the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense,96 
although there is still considerable resistance.97  The district court’s 
 
 96. Numerous courts in the United States have recognized that physical abuse 
perpetuated against the abductor is relevant to the Article 13(b) defense, even 
absent physical abuse to the children.  For cases where courts have granted the 
Article 13(b) defense based upon allegations of violence toward the mother with 
minimal, if any, direct abuse of the children, see, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 
1346  (11th Cir. 2008) (determining that the father’s previous violent acts 
contributed to the grave risk of harm if the child were returned to the father); Walsh 
v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding the father’s continued disregard 
of court orders suggested that he would violate any undertakings he made to ensure 
the children’s safety); Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259(PKC), 2007 WL 
2600862, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) (pointing to a doctor’s conclusion that a risk 
of future abuse to the children existed because of repeated abuse towards the 
mother); Elyashiv v. Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d 394, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (despite the 
fact that one of the three children was never physically abused and not suffering 
post-traumatic stress disorder, court found a grave risk of physical and psychological 
harm if that child were returned); Dimer v. Dimer, No. 99-2-03610-7SEA (Wash. Super. 
Ct. July 29, 1999), available at http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
convtext.showFull&code=218&lng=1 (granting Article 13(b) defense because of 
violence perpetrated against mother). 
In some cases, the respondent has alleged that the petitioner committed acts of 
violence against both the child and mother, and the courts view the violence in the 
family as cumulative.  See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 608 (6th Cir. 2007); In 
re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 396 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006); Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 
F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005); Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, No. 05 CV 1182, 2008 
WL 239150, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2008); Elyashiv, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 408; Reyes 
Olguin v. Cruz Santana, No. 03 CV 6299 JG, 2005 WL 67094, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 
2005); Blondin v. DuBois, 19 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 97. While more and more courts recognize that adult domestic violence is 
relevant to the “grave risk of harm defense,” some courts still dismiss the violence 
because it is only “sporadic.”  See supra note 95.  These courts do not understand that 
“sporadic” violence needs to be contextualized within the parties’ relationship before 
it can be discounted.  Some batterers exercise substantial power and control short of 
physical violence, and the use of occasional battery reinforces their ability to 
maintain power and control through fear, humiliation, and other means.  See, e.g., 
Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:  Toward A 
New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 743 (2005) (explaining coercive control and 
the various acts that contribute to it); Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering:  From 
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 985–86 (1995) 
(indicating that “physical violence may not be the most significant factor about most 
battering relationships” and that “sporadic” violence can reinforce other methods of 
control).  A court cannot make an assessment of dangerousness by merely 
characterizing the violence as sporadic, without considering all of the abusive 
behavior.  Some batterers who exercise only sporadic violence can be quite 
dangerous.  See, e.g., Stark, supra, at 1017–18 (noting examples where the overall 
violence level in the relationship has been low).  The danger can be to the child.  
Stark states: 
Although all battering relationships present the serious risk that the 
batterer will hurt the mother by hurting her child, particularly when 
the violence level is high, it is most convincing as a post-separation 
strategy when the overall level of violence in the relationship has been 
low (for example, where possible means of control such as withdrawal 
or absence from the home have been dominant).  Signs of tangential 
spouse abuse include little interest in parenting prior to the divorce, 
the Father insisting on a protracted custody fight despite little chance 
of success, the Father exhibiting a highly defensive personal style, 
lacking empathy for mother or children, and being unwilling to accept 
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opinions in Adan v. Avans, discussed below, demonstrate the 
lingering reluctance of some courts to regard domestic violence 
allegations as relevant to the “grave risk of harm” defense, and more 
importantly for purposes of this Article, their disregard of the 
“intolerable situation” language.98 The Swiss formulation of 
 
responsibility for any violence, control tactics, substance use, or other 
problems.  Another important sign is the children’s fear of their father. 
Id. 
The coercion and control in the relationship are also relevant to whether 
returning the child poses a grave risk that the children will be placed in an 
“intolerable situation.”  The absence of continuous physical violence says nothing 
about the harm to the victim from the controlling behavior and the consequent 
effect on the children. Cf. Leslie A. Sackett & Daniel G. Saunders, The Impact of 
Different Forms of Psychological Abuse on Battered Women, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 113 
(1999) (finding “psychological abuse was a much stronger predictor of fear than 
physical abuse”); id. at 105 (“72% of the battered women [in one study] reported 
that emotional abuse had a more severe impact than physical abuse . . . .”) (citing 
D.R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive Relationships, 5 J. 
FAM. VIOL. 107 (1990)); see also Lauren Bennett, Lisa Goodman & Mary Ann Dutton, 
Risk Assessment Among Batterers Arrested for Domestic Assault:  The Salience of Psychological 
Abuse, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1190, 1191, 1199–2000 (2000) (indicating that 
psychological abuse had a strong predictive power of reabuse within three months of 
charges for misdemeanor domestic violence). 
For an example of how courts miss the significance of coercion and control, see 
Arguelles, 2008 WL 913325, at *3, *4, *14 (discounting significance of allegations 
related to power and control, including threat that petitioner was “capable of killing” 
if respondent ever left him, suicidal acts by petitioner, and admissions that he “felt 
like hurting his wife,” because acts were “limited” and not directed at child).  But see 
Matovski v. Matovski, No. 06 Civ. 4259(PKC), 2007 WL 2600862, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
31, 2007) (finding “petitioner repeatedly, and for a period of years, inflicted upon 
respondent physical, verbal and psychological abuse” and concluding petitioner “was 
very controlling and respondent was afraid to disobey him for fear of retribution”). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently addressed the range of 
physical violence that exists in relationships and categorized it for purposes of the 
Article 13(b) defense.  See Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(suggesting three broad categories of abusive situations exist:  (1) the abuse is 
relatively minor, so the 13(b) defense most likely will not be met; (2) the abuse is 
“clearly grave, such as where there is credible evidence of sexual abuse, other 
similarly grave physical or psychological abuse, death threats, or serious neglect,” so 
13(b) defense most likely will be granted; and (3) the abuse falls somewhere between 
these two extremes, so whether a 13(b) defense is granted is highly fact-specific).  
This categorization has already been cited by other courts.  See, e.g., Giuseppe v. 
Giuseppe, No. 07-CV-15240, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29785, at *11–13 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
11, 2008).  Notably, the Sixth Circuit did not say that relatively minor abuse cannot 
establish the defense, only that it is “unlikely.” Simcox, 511 F.3d at 607.  For cases “in 
the middle” of the violence spectrum, the court noted the “fact-intensive inquiry,” 
“including the nature and frequency of the abuse, the likelihood of its recurrence, 
and whether there are any enforceable undertakings that would sufficiently 
ameliorate the risk of harm to the child caused by its return.”  Simcox, 511 F.3d at 
607–08.  To accomplish this inquiry, courts must look at the nature of the abuse, 
which goes beyond considering the number of times a party has been hit. 
 98. See generally Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711 (D.N.J. 
July 30, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008); Adan v. 
Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007) (deciding case 
on remand), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008).  To be 
clear, some courts abroad have considered it to be an “intolerable situation” if the 
mother faced possible domestic violence upon return.  See, e.g., PF v. MF, [1992]  
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“intolerable situation” seems particularly apt and helpful for 
respondents and children who face a situation like that alleged in 
Adan. 
E. An Example:  Adan v. Avans 
The district court’s decisions in Adan v. Avans,99 both before and 
after the Third Circuit’s first appellate decision in the case, illustrate 
the difficulties some respondents still face when they allege they are 
victims of domestic violence and try to invoke the Article 13(b) “grave 
risk of harm” defense. 
1. The facts 
Adan involved a naturalized U.S. citizen mother (Avans), who fled 
to the United States with her daughter.100  The father (Adan) had 
abused the mother in Argentina, and the mother alleged that he had 
also abused their daughter, Arianna.101  The mother claimed that the 
Argentinean police and courts did not protect her.102  The father 
invoked the Hague Convention to obtain Arianna’s return to 
Argentina.103
At the initial hearing, the mother alleged very serious domestic 
violence, claiming that the father was violent to her over the course of 
their relationship.104  Among other things, he allegedly “locked her in 
his bedroom, beat her, threatened her with further harm if she ever 
left him[,]” “tried to suffocate her with a pillow,” threatened “to 
drown the child if Avans ever left him,” “pushed her while holding 
[the child,]” screamed in the infant’s ear until Avans agreed to return 
to him, threatened Avans and the child with a gun, chained the gate 
of Avans’s home shut so she could not leave, and raped her in front 
of their daughter.105  Avans also alleged that Adan sexually abused 
their daughter.  She claimed that she found a pubic hair on the 
three-year-old’s vagina, that her daughter said that she bathed with 
her father and that he “loves [her] with his tongue” (i.e., kissed her 
by putting his tongue inside her mouth), and that the father “‘was 
 
2 I.R. 390 (Ir.), available at http://www.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0102.htm 
(holding the return of children to father would be an “intolerable situation” where 
the father was violent toward the mother and one of the children, and the father 
financially neglected the children). 
 99. Adan, 2007 WL 1850910; Adan, 2007 WL 2212711. 
 100. In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 101. Id. at 386–87. 
 102. Id. at 386. 
 103. Id. at 385. 
 104. Id. at 385–87. 
 105. Id. at 385–86. 
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putting something hot in her butt’ that hurt.”106  The mother claimed 
that the Argentinean police and court system did nothing to help her 
because the father paid bribes to the police and judges.107  She 
claimed, for example, that the police did not enforce her temporary 
restraining order when the father allegedly violated it.108  The mother 
took her daughter to the United States after that incident, although 
the Argentinean trial court had not yet adjudicated her allegations 
against the father.109
The district court issued a one-sentence order granting the father’s 
petition for his daughter’s return.110  The court’s oral comments 
revealed that the court did not believe the allegations amounted to a 
“grave risk,”111 and even if they did, the child should be returned 
because “‘this matter is best determined by Argentinean courts 
because it is all interwoven with a struggle . . . for custody and 
determination of domestic abuse, which is not the purpose of the 
Convention.’”112
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated 
the district court’s order and remanded the case.  The Third Circuit 
thought that the allegations, if true, would give rise to a successful 
Article 13 defense.113  The appellate court could not determine, 
however, whether the evidence of child abuse was clear and 
convincing and whether the Argentinean courts were incapable or 
unwilling to give the child adequate protection.114  The Third Circuit 
criticized the district court for ignoring “large portions of [the 
mother’s] testimony” and adopting “an overly compartmentalized 
view of child abuse.”115  For example, the trial court ignored Avans’s 
testimony regarding the child’s baths with her father and the father’s 
screaming in the child’s ear.116  The appellate court noted that Adan 
denied sexually assaulting his daughter, but “he did not specifically 
deny particular acts of abuse.”117  The Third Circuit instructed the 
district court to consider the totality of the circumstances on remand, 
 
 106. Id. at 386. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 386. 
 110. Id. at 387. 
 111. Id. at 388. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 395. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 396. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 386. 
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for this approach might make “innocent”118 acts look more 
ominous.119
The Third Circuit also focused on the domestic violence 
allegations.  It found those allegations independently significant, 
even without taking account of three pieces of evidence that Avans 
tried to use to supplement the record on appeal.120  The appellate 
court noted the father’s denials, but again commented that “he did 
not specifically deny particular acts of abuse” at the hearing.121  The 
Third Circuit criticized the lower court for its lack of findings on 
specific allegations, such as “the allegations that Adan abused Avans 
and raped her in front of Arianna.”122  Also, the district court “did not 
reject Avans’s testimony that she had been repeatedly abused, raped, 
and threatened with a gun.”123
The Third Circuit held that the evidence of domestic violence, 
standing alone, was sufficient to establish a “grave risk of harm” to 
Arianna: 
[T]he evidence of Adan’s abuse of Avans is relevant to the District 
Court’s determination of whether returning Arianna to Argentina 
would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.  See, e.g., Walsh v. 
Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Circuit) (holding that such evidence 
is relevant when considering whether a grave risk of harm to a 
child exists because ‘credible social science literature establishes 
that serial spousal abusers are also likely to be child abusers’ and 
‘both state and federal law have recognized that children are at 
increased risk of physical and psychological injury themselves when 
they are in contact with a spousal abuser’).124
 
 118. Id. at 396–97.  For example, the trial court said that the statement that he 
“love[d] [her] with his tongue” is “not significant because . . . it’s not unusual in this 
country at least for parents and grandparents to at times in playing with young 
toddlers to kiss them with tongues on the cheeks and then sometimes the tongue 
may have gone too far.”  Id. at 388. 
 119. See id. at 397 (suggesting that although the manner of kissing the child might 
on its own seem innocent, “when coupled with [the mother’s other] reports . . . such 
an incident is far less susceptible to innocent explanation”). 
 120. The evidence was the following:  (1) documents that showed Avans now had 
a permanent restraining order against Adan in New Jersey because he apparently 
repeatedly violated the temporary order; (2) an e-mail from Adan to Avans in 2004 
that said, “when I see you I think I will rape you totally”; and (3) another e-mail from 
2004 that said, “now that my mind is clear from drugs and from alcohol I can realize 
all the time I lost and all the damages I caused you, (and [Arianna]).”  Id. at 388. 
 121. Id. at 386. 
 122. Id. at 388. 
 123. Id. at 396.  In fact, the district court “discounted” the gun incident, which it 
thought was relevant to proving a “grave risk of harm” to the child, because it 
happened approximately twenty-three months before Avans removed the child from 
Argentina.  Id. at 388. 
 124. Id. at 396 n.6. 
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By citing Walsh, the Third Circuit acknowledged that domestic 
violence poses risks to children in addition to the risk that the 
perpetrator will also abuse the child.  Walsh cited state and federal 
laws and cases that explicitly discussed the potential for children to 
be physically harmed by violence that is directed at the adult victim, 
as well as the potential for emotional harm from witnessing the 
abuse.125
The Third Circuit also addressed Argentina’s ability to protect the 
mother and child, on the theory that the availability of such 
protection defeats an Article 13(b) defense.126  The Third Circuit 
noted that the district court had not sufficiently analyzed Argentina’s 
ability to protect Avans and her daughter.127
Avans testified about her numerous experiences with Argentine law 
enforcement when police officers refused to offer her any 
assistance, and the fact that Adan violated a temporary restraining 
order issued by an Argentine court after the police refused to 
enforce it.  Adan did not contest these allegations in his testimony, 
and the District Court did not discount Avans’ testimony. . . . It 
therefore failed to consider and reject the majority of Avans’s proof 
related to the inaction of Argentine courts and police.128
On remand, Avans lost again.129  Judge Walls, the judge who initially 
ordered the return of the child, again ordered that the child be 
returned.130  This time, however, the court made detailed findings of 
fact.  Although the court believed that Adan committed domestic 
violence,131 it thought that Avans exaggerated the violence.132  It 
discounted Avans’s allegations because she added new allegations of 
 
 125. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing, inter alia, H.R. 
Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong., 104 Stat. 182, 5182 (1990) that says “[w]hereas children 
often become targets of physical abuse themselves or are injured when they attempt 
to intervene on behalf of a parent,” and Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 439 
(Mass. 1996), where the court noted, “[i]t is well documented that witnessing 
domestic violence, as well as being one of its victims, has a profound impact on 
children. . . .  There are significant reported psychological problems in children who 
witness domestic violence.”) (citation omitted). 
 126. In re Adan, 437 F.3d at 395. 
 127. Id. at 396. 
 128. Id. at 397–98. 
 129. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 1850910, at *14 (D.N.J. June 
25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. The district court found “that Avans was the subject of domestic abuse from 
time to time by the Petitioner and that what she alleges, in the main, is plausible.”  
Id. at *11.  This included a finding that “[a]t times, [Adan] resorted to using force.”  
Id. 
 132. The court refused to accept all of Avans’s allegations and did not find that 
the abuse was “chronic and pervasive.”  Id.  The court thought Avans “exaggerated 
and embellished the abuse in order to prevail in court.”  Id. 
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violence on remand133 and returned to Adan three times.134  It also did 
not believe that the domestic violence made the allegations of child 
sexual abuse more probable;135 in fact, it found that Avans had not 
proven the alleged child abuse by clear and convincing evidence.136  
The court never considered whether the domestic violence alone 
created any risks to the child other than the alleged sexual abuse.  
The court also concluded that Avans failed to establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that “Argentine authorities are unable or 
unwilling to protect her and her child.”137  The court believed that the 
particular judge scheduled to hear the matter in Argentina was not 
corrupt.138  The Argentinean judge had assured the U.S. court that 
the child would not be returned to her father pending the hearing, 
but would be placed in foster care.139  Apparently, the child was to be 
taken into protective custody by a social worker upon arrival in 
Argentina,140 even though the mother might return to Argentina 
also.141
The court denied Avans’s request that it reconsider its decision.142  
Avans claimed the court “committed clear error in finding that the 
child had not been sexually abused without ordering an independent 
evaluation of [the child] to determine as much.”143  In response, the 
court chastised Avans for suggesting that it should have ordered an 
examination for the child, noting that the court had no obligation to 
sua sponte order an examination and that neither party had requested 
it.144  The court also noted that Avans could have, but did not, put in 
her own evidence on this point.145  The court reiterated that even if 
 
 133. See id. (“For example, Avans makes far greater allegations of abuse by Adan 
now than in her earlier June 2005 testimony without any explanation why she 
omitted such earlier. . . .  This Court is not clearly convinced of the believability of 
such ‘latter’ allegations.”). 
 134. The court also inferred that the abuse was not as bad as alleged because 
“Avans has returned to Adan on at least three different occasions over the course of 
their relationship.”  Id. 
 135. Id. at *12. 
 136. Id. at *13. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. at *14 (arguing that one could just as easily read news stories that 
highlight potential shortcomings in the United States court system and further 
explaining that “no specific evidence has been presented to suggest that the 
proceeding which will take places in San Martin . . . will be anything other than fair 
and appropriate”). 
 139. Id. at *13. 
 140. Id. at *14. 
 141. Id. at *6. 
 142. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30, 
2007). 
 143. Id. at *2. 
 144. See id. at *2–3. 
 145. Id. at *3. 
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sexual abuse were found, the Argentinean court system could protect 
the child.146  Avans also wanted the court to consider post-hearing 
evidence that the petitioner was convicted of contempt for violating 
the restraining order.147  The court held that the contempt conviction 
was irrelevant because the event occurred after the hearing on 
remand.148  The court put an exclamation mark at the end of its 
decision:  it refused to stay its decision pending appeal.149
The Third Circuit did, however, grant a stay.150  The case was fully 
briefed and argued orally.  Avans was permitted to supplement the 
appellate record with a psychological report detailing an examination 
of Arianna that was conducted after the district court’s order was 
issued.151   
On the day of oral argument, the Third Circuit, in an amazing 
show of resolve, ruled from the bench that there was a grave risk of 
harm as a matter of law.  It reversed the trial court and stated that a 
judgment order be entered “yesterday” denying the father’s 
petition.152  The panel focused on a report from Department of Youth 
and Family Services that detailed the risks of physical and 
psychological harm that Arianna would face if she were returned, as 
well as other evidence.153 The Court of Appeals expressed dismay that 
the district court gave no consideration to various pieces of evidence 
suggesting psychological and physical harm before making its 
ruling.154  It is unclear whether the Third Circuit will issue a written 
opinion, but hopefully one will be forthcoming because lower courts 
still need guidance on the “grave risk of harm” component of Article 
13(b). 
 
 146. See id. at *4 (explaining that “a ninety-day restraining order [against Adan] 
was granted” to Avans leading up to the trial in Argentina and that there was no 
evidence that the Argentinean courts could not appropriately protect the child). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. (stating that a motion to reconsider is used to bring information to the 
court’s attention that existed at the time of the hearing and that may have changed 
the court’s decision; it is not to be used to extend the time for litigating a matter). 
 149. Id. at *7. 
 150. E-mail from Daniel Mulvihill to Merle H. Weiner, July 21, 2008 (on file with 
author). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  E-mail from Leonard Evans to Jeffrey Edleson and Erika Sussman, Sept. 23, 
2008 (on file with author). 
 153.  Id.; Bob Braun, Court Spares Girl, 8, From Deportation, Newark Star Ledger, 
Sept. 23, 2008,  http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2008/09/court_spares_girl_8_ 
from_depor.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). 
 154.  E-mail from Evans, supra note 152.  Braun reports that Judge Garth cited 
twelve pieces of evidence regarding the abuse of the mother and child that the judge 
had improperly excluded.  See Braun, supra note 153. 
  
2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 365 
                                                
2. Was the situation in Adan an “intolerable situation”? 
It is easy to find fault with the district court’s analysis in Adan v. 
Avans.  Among other things, the court’s reasons for finding that 
Avans exaggerated the domestic violence are subject to criticism.155  
 
 155. The court was correct that Avans made new allegations of violence against 
Adan at the hearing on remand.  Some of the new allegations had independent 
corroboration, suggesting that they were not manufactured.  For example, Avans’s 
older son claimed he witnessed Adan choking Avans, forcing her head under water, 
and locking her in the backyard in 1999.  See Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 
2007 WL 1850910, at *9 (D.N.J. June 25, 2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 2008 WL 4368881 
(3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2008). 
The fact that some allegations were new does not mean the allegations were 
fabricated or others exaggerated.  First, the remand hearing occurred two years after 
the initial hearing on the Hague petition.  Compare In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 381 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (noting that Adan’s petition was filed in 2005), with Adan, 2007 WL 
1850910, at *1 (dealing with the remand hearing in 2007).  The timing of the 
remand hearing gave the respondent time to recall all of the abuse and made it more 
likely that any repression of the abuse had abated.  See Mary Ann Dutton, 
Understanding Women’s Reponses to Domestic Violence:  A Redefinition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 1221–22 (1993) (“Numerous indicators of 
psychological distress and dysfunction have been identified as sequelae to physical 
and sexual violence.  These include . . . difficulty concentrating, or memory 
problems such as amnesia and dissociation . . . .”) (citing, inter alia, Loewenstein, 
Psychogenic Amnesia and Psychogenic Fuge:  A Comprehensive Review, in DISSOCIATIVE 
DISORDERS:  A CLINICAL REVIEW 47 (David Spiegel et al., eds., 1987)); Stephanie 
Vitanza, Laura C.M. Vogel, & Linda L. Marshall, Distress and Symptoms of Postraumatic 
Stress Disorder in Abused Women, 10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 23, 24, 31 (1995) (citing data 
that showed 33% to 84% of women seeking help as victims of physical violence have 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder). 
Second, Avans’s attorneys may have decided that Avans should testify to all of the 
abuse on remand to show better the long-term pattern of violence and emotional 
harm directed at Avans, especially as the Third Circuit had indicated that domestic 
violence toward the parent is itself relevant.  See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 398 (3d Cir. 
2006) (directing the district court to take into account allegations of abuse to both 
Arianna and her mother).  This strategy, and the new allegations, should have 
buttressed her argument, not undermined it.  In addition, her attorneys may have 
suggested that Avans should include some details about why she returned to Adan on 
three occasions.  This testimony raised additional allegations of violence:  Avans said 
that “she moved back to Argentina out of fear that Adan would hurt the child if she 
did not”; that she “did not want to put her cousin through the ordeal of having Adan 
show up uninvited and make a scene” because he was harassing her; and finally, that 
“she returned because Adan had threatened to come to the United States and kill 
her and Arianna if she did not.”  Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *10.  The court did not 
believe her reasons, and interpreted her actions as demonstrating that “the alleged 
abuse was not as bad as” she claimed.  Id. at *12. 
The district court made a point of criticizing the lack of corroborating evidence 
for some of Avans’s claims.  For example, the court said “Avans did not submit any 
police reports into evidence.”  Id. at *9.  Apparently Avans’s counsel tried to submit 
photocopies of documents, but the court insisted that the documents comply with 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and be properly authenticated.  See e-mail from Daniel 
Mulvihill, supra note 150 (on file with author).  This requirement was directly 
contrary to federal law, which expressly says documents in Hague proceedings need 
not be authenticated.  See 42 U.S.C. § 11605 (2006) (stating that “no authentication 
of such application, petition, document, or information shall be required in order 
for the [Hague Convention] application, petition, document, or information to be 
admissible in court”). 
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Yet for purposes of this analysis, it is sufficient to assume that only 
some of Avans’s allegations were in fact true, as the district court 
found.  The court held “that Avans was the subject of domestic abuse 
from time to time by the Petitioner and that what she alleges, in the 
main, is plausible.”156  This included a finding that “[a]t times, he 
resorted to using force.”157  While it is not exactly clear which 
allegations the district court found substantiated, one is left with a 
considerable amount of violence if one assumes the truth of only 
some of the allegations made at the initial hearing and reiterated at 
the remand hearing.158  It is important to note that the court never 
rejected Avans’s testimony regarding police inaction and did not find 
that the police would act any differently if she returned.159
Assuming these facts, the concept of “intolerable situation,” as 
defined by the Swiss,160 could have led the district court to rule 
differently.  The first criterion is that “placement with the parent who 
filed the application is manifestly not in the child’s best interests.”161  
The district court’s decision suggests that it would have found this 
criterion satisfied.  After all, the district court approved of the 
arrangement whereby the child would enter foster care upon her 
return to Argentina.162  Judge Walls probably recognized that the 
mother’s child abuse allegations might be true, despite her inability 
to meet the high burden of proof (clear and convincing evidence).  
After all, the only expert called in the case said that she needed more 
time to determine whether the child had been sexually abused.163
Even if the father’s alleged abuse had been directed solely at the 
mother and not the child, the first prong of the Swiss law would have 
been satisfied.  It is detrimental for a child to be in the custody of a 
domestic violence perpetrator.  Congress has said, “[F]or purposes of 
determining child custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a 
 
 156. Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *11. 
 157. Id. 
 158. This approach seems justified given that the judge thought the mother was “a 
little more credible” than the father in the first hearing and that the father “lied or 
was not being truthful when he denied that he had ever verbally threatened [Avans] 
or abused her, if we use that term in the context of verbal abuse.” In re Adan, 437 
F.3d at 387. 
 159. Id. at 397. 
 160. See supra text accompanying note 41 (outlining the Swiss law for describing 
an intolerable situation). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Adan, 2007 WL 1850910, at *14 (explaining the Argentinean judge “made 
clear” that Arianna would become a ward of the state until a full hearing was 
conducted). 
 163. See id. at *10 (commenting that “Dr. Borjas was unable to offer a professional 
opinion” as to whether the child had been sexually abused but “indicated that 
further study would be necessary”). 
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spouse should create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to 
the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.”164  The 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) recommends that “where there is 
proof of abuse, batterers should be presumed by law to be unfit 
custodians for their children.”165
The facts of Adan v. Avans also satisfied the second Swiss 
criterion.166  Avans “[was] not, given all of the circumstances, in a 
position to take care of the child in the State where the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the abduction or . . . this 
[could] not reasonably be required from this parent.”167  Avans’s 
unrefuted testimony about her inability to get police protection in 
Argentina would make it both unfair and unwise to expect her to 
return to Argentina.168
Finally, it manifestly would not be in Arianna’s best interest to be 
placed in foster care.  Being placed in foster care pending a custody 
determination is a confusing and unsettling experience for a young 
child.169  From the child’s perspective, foster care means separation 
from a loving parent, and that is very difficult.  Even children who are 
removed to family foster care because of serious abuse or neglect 
almost uniformly describe missing their families:  “56% reported that 
 
 164. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SENSE OF RESPECTING CHILD CUSTODY 
DETERMINATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 101-737 (Sept. 21, 1990); see also Merle H. Weiner, 
The Potential and Challenge of Transnational Litigation for Feminists Concerned About 
Domestic Violence Here and Abroad, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 749, 751–52 
(2003) (listing laws and law reform efforts that acknowledge the connection between 
domestic violence and custody, visitation, and related determinations). 
 165. HOWARD DAVIDSON, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON 
CHILDREN:  A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 13 (1994).  
The ABA report identifies three characteristics of unfit custodians in this context: 
First, the abuser has ignored the child’s interests by harming the child’s 
other parent.  Second, the pattern of control and domination common to 
abusers often continues after the physical separation of the abuser and 
victim.  Third, abusers are highly likely to use children in their care, or 
attempt to gain custody of their children, as a means of controlling their 
former spouse or partner. 
Id. 
 166. See supra text accompanying note 41 (setting forth the criteria that define an 
“intolerable situation” under the Swiss Act). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that Adan did 
not contest Avans’s testimony related to the failure of Argentinean police officers to 
provide her any assistance, and noting that the district court did not discount Avans’s 
testimony). 
 169. Cf. Peggy D. Dallmann, Comment, The Hague Convention on Parental Child 
Abduction:  An Analysis of Emerging Trends in Enforcement by U.S. Courts, 5 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 171, 197 n.160 (1994) (“Ordering the child back to another country to 
be placed in a third party’s hands (which could be either a foster home or some type 
of foster-care institution) would only result in even more disruption in the short life 
of a young child, especially where the court has good reason to believe that the child 
has already experienced an emotionally traumatic family life.”). 
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they miss their parents most of the time.”170  Foster care, 
consequently, can both precipitate and exacerbate behavioral and 
emotional problems. 
When a child has a loving, non-abusive parent as the caregiver, 
foster care is also an inferior option because the new family is of an 
unknown quality.  One study found that 13% of foster parents were 
ranked as “barely adequate.”171  Another study found that 25% of the 
children were “physically punished severely” while in foster care.172  A 
study that reviewed many of the studies concluded, 
[T]here is reason to believe that a proportion of approved foster 
parents and families (approximately 15–20%) have problems in 
their home environment, family functioning and parenting. . . 
.[I]n several key areas—parental mental health, marital conflict, 
social support, and temperament—we simply do not know what, if 
any, proportion of foster parents have significant limitations.173
It is well known that foster care placement is often not stable,174 and 
this presents yet another reason why it is manifestly not in a child’s 
best interest to be placed there when a loving, non-abusive parent is 
available instead.  Even children who come into foster care without 
behavioral problems may be negatively affected by switching 
placements.175  Admittedly, most custody adjudications are not 
supposed to drag on for years, and the horror stories about foster 
care are generally referencing long-term foster care.  Children’s time 
in care, in fact, may be reduced if a country has expedited 
procedures for provisional measures.176  Yet the Wood case is a 
 
 170. Penny Ruff Johnson et al., Family Foster Care Placement:  The Child’s Perspective, 
74 CHILD WELFARE 959, 967 (1995). 
 171. Isabel Dando & Brian Minty, What Makes Good Foster Parents?, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. 
WORK 385, 389 (1987). 
 172. See DAVID FANSHEL ET AL., FOSTER CHILDREN IN A LIFE COURSE PERSPECTIVE 91 
(1990) (reporting data from an interview study that asked foster children about their 
experience in the Casey Family Living Program). 
 173. John G. Orme & Cheryl Buerhler, Foster Family Characteristics and Behavioural 
and Emotional Problems of Foster Children:  A Narrative Review, 50 FAM. REL. 3, 12 (2001). 
 174. See Sigrid James, Why Do Foster Care Placements Disrupt?  An Investigation of 
Reasons for Placement Change in Foster Care, 78 SOC. SERV. REV. 601, 605–06 (2004) 
(concluding that the average number of placement changes for foster children over 
an eighteen month period was 3.6, but noting some children in the study changed 
placement as many as fifteen times over the eighteen month period). 
 175. See Rae R. Newton et al., Children and Youth in Foster Care:  Disentangling the 
Relationship Between Problem Behaviours and Number in Placements, 24 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 1363, 1372 (2000).  But see Orme & Buerhler, supra note 173, at 3 (arguing 
that “the link between foster care placement and child problem behaviours is not 
well established, and the causal direction of this relationship is unclear”); id. at 12 
(bemoaning the “startling” lack of research that exists on foster family characteristics 
and the behavioural and emotional problems of foster children). 
 176. See, e.g., Re O (Child Abduction:  Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 362 
(U.K.) (noting that a custody contest can take eighteen months to two years to 
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reminder that foster care instability can occur even for children 
awaiting a custody adjudication.177  Custody cases can be significantly 
delayed for a variety of reasons, including court calendars, the 
unavailability of court services (such as custody evaluators), and the 
parties themselves.178  One study indicated that it took, on average, 
eighteen to twenty-two months to complete a contested custody 
dispute in three Colorado counties.179  Even if a custody case proceeds 
quickly, so that the children only need short-term foster care, 
placement instability can occur.  Placement changes occur for a wide 
variety of reasons, including for reasons that have nothing to do with 
the child.  Interruptions are caused by administrative rules (e.g., strict 
time limits for short-time placements, such as thirty days) and foster 
family particularities (e.g., the foster family relocates, goes on 
vacation, or has a life emergency and can no longer provide care).180
It is impossible to predict whether the district court would have 
found an “intolerable situation” in Adan v. Avans if it had followed 
the Swiss approach.181  However, it certainly might have made a 
difference because the Swiss approach was meant for just such a case.  
The Swiss formulation would have helped guide the court to the 
conclusion that returning Arianna would pose a grave risk that she 
would be placed in an intolerable situation.  Likewise, the Swiss 
formulation should assist other courts in their assessment of whether 
a situation is “intolerable,” and thereby potentially change the results 
for some respondents and children whose cases evoke our sympathy. 
 
complete, with appeals, but emergency procedures exist to obtain a provisional order 
and that can be heard within one or two months); Report on the Fifth Meeting, supra 
note 22, ¶ 167 (quoting Chair who believed that the Special Commission recognized 
that children’s interests “may be affected in those cases where there was likely to be a 
long delay in the habitual residence country before the custody proceedings were 
heard”). 
 177. See Legislative Assembly-Grievance, supra note 12 (noting the children were 
kept away from their parents for nineteen months, with no contact with their father, 
and transferred between six different foster homes during that period). 
 178. See id. (referring to the procedures in the Wood case that delayed the progress 
of the custody adjudication). 
 179. See Jessica Pearson & Maria A. Luchesi Ring, Judicial Decision-Making in 
Contested Custody Cases, 21 J. FAM. L. 703, 712–13 (1982) (examining contested 
custody cases in Denver, Jefferson, and Adams counties, from 1973 to 1978).  
 180. See James, supra note 174, at 619–20 (finding that within an eighteen month 
period, 580 foster children averaged around three placement changes, with a range 
of 0 to 15). 
 181. The trial court’s general hostility to the mother and her allegations—and its 
disregard of the Third Circuit’s guidance—suggests that the mother may have lost 
even with this argument. See discussion supra Part II.E.1. 
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F. Are There Reasons to Reject the Swiss Understanding of  
“Intolerable Situation”? 
Some may oppose this Article’s call for courts in the United States 
to follow Switzerland’s example.  Critics may worry about the 
invigoration of the “intolerable situation” defense generally, and 
about the permissiveness of the provisions in the Swiss statute.  On 
the other hand, some critics may worry that the Swiss law risks 
restricting the defense unnecessarily.  On balance, the Swiss proposal 
appears appropriate, although the criteria must not be interpreted 
too broadly nor deemed essential prerequisites to the defense’s 
success. 
1. The risk of creating a loophole 
Fearmongers who oppose invocation of the “grave risk of harm” 
defense will undoubtedly claim that the use of “intolerable situation” 
will spell doom for the Convention, creating a loophole too large to 
fix.  These critics would prefer to maintain the status quo, where 
courts and parties largely ignore the separate meaning of “intolerable 
situation.” 
Ignoring the defense, however, is unacceptable from a separation 
of powers perspective.  The words are meant to be invoked in an 
appropriate situation, and the only question is whether a situation 
qualifies.  A court that ignores the defense, or subsumes it under the 
“physical or psychological harm” defense, unjustifiably disregards the 
intent of the Convention’s drafters and Congress.182
The “intolerable situation” provision should not become a 
loophole because the “grave risk of harm” defense has not become 
one.  Contracting states have managed to keep the interpretation of 
that provision narrow.183  Courts should be similarly vigilant in 
policing the application of the “intolerable situation” defense.  They 
should not find an “intolerable situation” when the facts establish no 
more than the situations identified in the State Department report as 
insufficient:  a home where money is in short supply, or more limited 
educational or other opportunities in the habitual residence.184  Yet a 
significant difference exists between those situations and a situation 
 
 182. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) incorporates the 
exceptions set forth in Article 13(b).  See 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) (2006); see also 
supra notes 32–36. 
 183. See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Fifth Meeting, supra note 38, § 1.4.2 
(noting that the courts in contracting states have rejected few applications based on 
an  Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense). 
 184. Legal Analysis, supra note 51, at 10510. 
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in which a child will be taken from a loving parent and placed in 
institutional care for the sole purpose of litigating a custody dispute 
in a particular jurisdiction.  For cases that fall outside of these 
recognized parameters for the defense, judges should be guided by 
the admonition that the defense is to be narrowly interpreted and the 
child’s situation must evoke an objective sense of intolerability.185  In 
addition, when respondents invoke the Swiss formulation in 
particular, judges should ensure that the respondent satisfies all of 
the prongs of the Swiss proposal—and by clear and convincing 
evidence186—so that the Swiss formulation itself does not become a 
loophole. 
2. The appropriateness of the underlying criteria 
It is worth examining each of the prongs of the Swiss law to see 
whether any one of them poses a particular risk to the Convention’s 
operation.  The discussion below concludes that the particular 
criteria in the Swiss statute are not themselves problematic. 
a. First criterion 
The first criterion requires an evaluation of whether placement 
with the left-behind parent is “manifestly not in the child’s best 
interest.”187  Some may be concerned that this criterion integrates a 
best interest inquiry into the analysis.  At first blush, the criterion 
appears to require a merits determination, something that courts 
adjudicating Hague petitions are supposed to avoid.188
Yet the Swiss approach is not akin to a merits determination 
because it contains the word “manifestly.”  A requirement that 
placement with a parent be “manifestly not in the child’s best 
interest” creates a high hurdle for the respondent to surmount.  
Therefore, this first criterion requires a much different analysis than 
the comparative exercise of deciding which parent is a better 
custodian for the child.  The defense focuses the court solely on the 
 
 185. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80. 
 186. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A) 
(2006) (requiring that the respondent establish the Article 13(b) or Article 20 
exception by clear and convincing evidence). 
 187. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5(a), Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, 
supra note 2, at 162. 
 188. See Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 16 (“[T]he judicial or 
administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been 
removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of 
custody until it has determined that the child is not to be returned under this 
Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a 
reasonable time following receipt of the notice.”). 
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petitioner, and the court must find a significant concern that affects 
that parent’s fitness.  As Professor Bucher, one of the drafters of the 
Swiss Act, stated, “[a] certain amount of strictness is imperative so as 
not to transform the dispute into a custody case.”189  Courts already 
engage in a similar sort of examination when they apply the “grave 
risk of harm” provision of Article 13.  In fact, whenever a court finds 
that the left-behind parent poses a grave risk of physical or 
psychological harm to the child, this first criterion would be 
established, although a grave risk of harm would not be necessary to 
meet this criterion.  For example, it would be sufficient if the 
petitioner did not want custody but was only seeking the child’s 
return to obtain or effectuate access rights.  These facts could be 
discovered with a few questions.  The first criterion would also be 
satisfied if the petitioner were a domestic violence perpetrator, even 
if the court found that none of the violence had been directed 
toward the child or that the violence had been sporadic.190  These 
facts will typically be in the record already if the respondent raised a 
“grave risk of harm” defense. 
b. Second criterion  
The second criterion will probably also generate debate.  Its 
formulation is fairly broad,191 and Professor Bucher envisions a wide 
interpretation of the provision.192  Not only would an abductor not be 
expected to return if her safety were at risk or she were subject to 
criminal prosecution,193 but the provision would also cover situations 
in which the abductor has good reasons to remain in the abducted-to 
forum, such as a new marriage or caring for a sick family member.194  
It would apply whenever the habitual residence is not “reasonably 
bearable” for the parent because “the problems and psychological 
burden felt by the abducting parent upon return also affect the child 
and endanger his personal well-being.”195
It would also be unreasonable to expect the abductor to return 
when the left-behind parent only seeks to maintain or establish 
visitation, and not custody, so long as the left-behind parent could 
 
 189. Bucher, supra note 2, at 158. 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 165–166. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 192. See Bucher, supra note 2, at 159, 161. 
 193. Cf. Re M (Abduction:  Child’s Objections), [2007] EWCA (Civ) 260, at ¶ 92 
(Eng.) (Wilson, L.J.,  concurring) (commenting in obiter dictum that efforts by Serbia 
to imprison abductor for drugs that were planted on her might qualify for the 
“intolerable situation” defense given the child’s fear for her mother’s safety). 
 194. See Bucher, supra note 12, at 158. 
 195. Id. at 159–60. 
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obtain visitation in the abducted-to country.196  One can imagine a 
number of other reasonable bases for the abductor’s unwillingness to 
return.  For example, the parent might lack resources to litigate 
custody in the child’s habitual residence, but might qualify for legal 
aid in the abducted-to country.  In short, the second criterion may 
cover a wide variety of situations where the abductor could not, or 
need not, return. 
It may seem inconsistent with the Convention to permit the 
defense in some of the situations described immediately above.  
Imagine, for example, a primary caretaker who claims she should not 
be expected to return because she has a new spouse in the abducted-
to country, and the court in the child’s habitual residence would not 
permit her to relocate.  Justice Singer, for one, concluded that the 
inability to relocate would not constitute an “intolerable situation,” 
unless that were categorically true for all abductors.197  He believed a 
contrary conclusion would “thwart the object of the Convention that 
the courts of the country of a child’s habitual residence should be the 
forum where decisions concerning him are taken.”198
Although the second criterion is broad, its breadth must be kept in 
context.  The second criterion is one of three criteria, and all three 
criteria must be satisfied to establish an “intolerable situation.”  
Unless placement of the child with the other parent is manifestly not 
in the child’s best interest and the child will be placed in foster care 
(or, perhaps, some other placement that is substandard when 
compared to the primary caregiver’s care), the defense will not 
apply.199  It is also useful to recall the function of the intolerable 
situation defense.  The defense gives courts some flexibility to avoid 
morally intolerable outcomes when deciding whether litigation 
 
 196. See id. at 160; Working Doc. No. 1E, supra note 20, at 2. 
 197. Re O (Child Abduction:  Undertakings), (1994) 2 Fam. 349, 356 (U.K.). 
 198. See id. at 356 (explaining that an inability to relocate— even if it caused the 
mother to be upset so as to seriously affect her ability to care for the children—would 
not be an “intolerable situation,” although an embargo on the removal of children 
from the country might be); see also P v. P (Minors) (Child Abduction), (1992) 1 
Fam. 155, 161 (U.K.) (rejecting defense when it rested on the fact that returning the 
children would cause the mother to return and she would become “a deeply 
unhappy person” and that “[a]n unhappy mother means unhappy children”); In re M 
(Abduction:  Undertakings), (1995) 1 Fam. 1021, 1027 (C.A.) (U.K.) (finding that a 
ne exeat clause was not an intolerable condition because the mother could seek its 
modification).  At least one commentator has said the same even for situations in 
which the petitioner only has rights of visitation coupled with a ne exeat clause.  See 
Kathleen A. O’Connor, What Gives You the Right!?—Ne Exeat Rights Should Constitute 
Rights of Custody After Furnes v. Reeves, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 449, 472 (2005). 
 199. See Swiss Federal Act art. 5, Dec. 21, 2007, feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 36 
(2008), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2008/33.pdf, translated in Bucher, 
supra note 2, at 162. 
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should occur in a particular forum.  After all, the Pérez-Vera Report 
says the Convention’s remedy “gives way before the primary interest 
of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological 
danger or being placed in an intolerable situation.”200  Courts should 
avoid placing a child in an intolerable situation, even if the abductor 
receives some incidental benefit from the court’s decision. 
To be clear, the adoption of the Swiss formulation would not mean 
that custodial parents have carte blanche to disregard relocation 
restrictions and ne exeat clauses; the defense will not always succeed 
because respondents may lack facts to support the other criteria.  
Even if the “intolerable situation” defense were to succeed, the court 
in the habitual residence could still sanction the custodial parent for 
contempt of its court order.201  In addition, a judge adjudicating 
custody in the requested state should certainly consider, and address 
appropriately, the abductor’s initial actions.  That court, for example, 
may decide that the fact of the abduction itself matters to its custody 
decision, even if the abductor’s reasons for refusing to return to the 
child’s habitual residence are reasonable for purposes of the 
“intolerable situation” defense.  The abductor’s reasons for the 
abduction may have been unjustified, showing the party to be 
insensitive to the child’s needs and interests.  The court that 
adjudicates custody and access will be able to examine thoroughly all 
of the allegations and do what is best for the child.   
c. Third criterion 
The third criterion requires that “foster care” manifestly not be in 
the child’s best interest.  The term “foster care” should be interpreted 
to reflect the purpose of the defense.  For example, “foster care” 
should not cover an arrangement like in Re S,202 a case in which a 
young girl was being returned to her mother and they were both to 
live together in an analysis home in Sweden.203  An analysis home is 
 
 200. Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 29. 
 201. In most cases, it would be improper, in my opinion, for the authorities in the 
requested state to file criminal charges and extradite the abductor after an Article 
13(b) defense has been established.  Unfortunately, the U.S. State Department 
recently sought the extradition of an abductor who claimed she fled to Costa Rica 
from the U.S. for safety reasons, but the request was denied after the woman 
obtained asylum from Costa Rica for her experiences with domestic violence in the 
United States.  See Gillian Gillers, U.S. Citizen, Wanted by Uncle Sam, Freed from Jail, TICO 
TIMES, July 29, 2008, available at http://www.ticotimes.net/dailyarchive/ 
2008_07/072808.htm#story1. 
 202. See Re S (Abduction:  Return into Care), (1999) 1 Fam. 843 (U.K.). 
 203. See id. (describing that the mother and child were to “be placed in an 
investigation home for assessment” so that Swedish authorities could assess whether 
the mother’s cohabitee made sexual advances toward her child, as alleged). 
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“arranged like a normal home,”204 but gives the social services staff the 
opportunity to investigate thoroughly the situation, including “the 
mother’s ability and qualifications to care for the child[,]”205 while 
also protecting the child against the risk of further abuse.206  This 
arrangement was proposed in Re S because the mother’s husband 
allegedly had sexually abused the child,207 thereby prompting the 
father to abduct the child.  On the other hand, “foster care” might 
cover a situation in which the child was being returned to a 
placement akin to foster care, although it had a different name or 
structure.208  The defense is meant to protect against the separation of 
a child from the child’s primary caregiver during the pendency of the 
custody adjudication when it is manifestly not in the child’s best 
interest to be with the other parent and when the nature of any third 
party placement is inferior to the abductor’s care. 
3. The risk of limiting the “intolerable situation” defense 
The final concern about the Swiss criterion is of a different type, 
and requires little ink to address.  Some may worry that the Swiss 
formulation is too limited.  After all, under the Swiss formulation, it 
would not be an “intolerable situation” to return a three-year-old 
child to a fit parent who had rights of custody solely by virtue of a 
statutory ne exeat clause even if (1) the child had been abducted 
almost immediately after birth so that the child and left-behind 
parent were strangers, (2) the abductor refused to return with the 
 
 204. Id. at 845. 
 205. Id. at 846. 
 206. Id. at 843. 
 207. It appeared that the mother had since separated from her husband, and he 
would not be living in the home.  See id. (noting that the mother had a new 
cohabitant). 
 208. Cf. Ontario Ct. v. M and M (Abduction:  Children’s Objections), (1997) 1 
Fam. 475 (U.K.).  In M and M, the Ontario court was seeking the return of children 
for whom custody and access proceedings had been instituted by the grandmother.  
Id. The children had been removed to England by their parents pending the court’s 
decision. Id.  The English court rejected the Hague application, finding that there 
was a grave risk of an “intolerable situation” if the older child were returned. Id. at 
485.  The father could not return with the child because the father had been 
deported; the mother could return with the child but would be left homeless and 
without money in Canada; and the older child, a nine-year-old, felt very strongly that 
she did not want to leave her parents and her settled life in England.  Id. 
The defense might also apply in a situation like that described in the Collated 
Reponses.  Apparently a court in the Netherlands granted an Article 13(b) defense 
because the mother could not obtain permission to live in the state of habitual 
residence and the court was concerned that the father could not care for the child 
alone.  See Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 3 Nov. 2005, LJN:  AV0718 (Neth.), in Collated 
Responses, supra note 88, at 205 (explaining that returning the child to the father 
would not have been in the best interests of the child and that a return would likely 
pose a grave risk to the child). 
  
376 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:335 
                                                
child because of new family obligations, a fear of criminal 
prosecution, and an inability to support herself or her child in the 
other country, and (3) the courts in the child’s habitual residence 
would deny the abductor permission to relocate.  In this hypothetical, 
a court adjudicating the return of the child might believe that foster 
care is unnecessary and, therefore, the third criteria would not be 
met.  The inability to satisfy the Swiss formulation might inhibit the 
court from granting the “intolerable situation” defense, even though 
the court might still perceive return to be an “intolerable situation” 
for the child.  Without deciding whether the “intolerable situation” 
defense should apply in such a case, it seems as if this fact pattern 
might be dealt with through other means:  the Article 12 well-settled 
defense,209 the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense,210 a refusal 
to equate a ne exeat clause with rights of custody,211 or by encouraging 
nations to adopt permissive relocation policies.  To the extent that 
these other options were unavailing, the Swiss proposal does not 
foreclose the application of the “intolerable situation” defense 
because the Swiss criteria are not the exclusive method for 
establishing an “intolerable situation.”212
III. COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 
The Swiss legislation is also admirable because it directs courts to 
appoint counsel for children when their parents are parties to a 
Hague Convention proceeding.  Switzerland’s automatic rule has the 
advantage of eliminating parents’ and courts’ discretion on this 
issue—a discretion that has caused inequities in the protection of 
children’s interests.  In fact, Switzerland required that counsel be 
appointed in all cases because it found that judges were rarely 
exercising their authority and appointing representatives for children 
 
 209. See, e.g., Van Driessche v. Ohio-Esezeoboh, 466 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848, 852 
(S.D. Tex. 2006) (finding child was well-settled; the fact that the respondent was 
potentially subject to criminal prosecution in the requesting country suggested that 
the court should not apply equitable tolling provision, but should grant the defense). 
 210. See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting that a 
court may consider the fact that a child is settled as part of an analysis of “grave risk 
of harm”). 
 211. See supra text accompanying note 31 (describing how courts in the United 
States are split on whether rights of visitation coupled with a ne exeat clause create 
custody rights entitling the holder to a remedy of return). 
 212. In fact, courts around the globe have sometimes interpreted “intolerable 
situation” differently than the Swiss law.  See supra text accompanying notes 88 and 
89.  The types of decisions discussed in notes 61–64, 88, 89, 98, and 193 would be 
unaffected by the Swiss interpretation of “intolerable situation.” 
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in divorce proceedings, and the drafters had a commitment to 
ensuring that every child in a Hague proceeding have counsel.213   
Courts in the United States sometimes appoint guardians ad litem, 
counsel, or both for children in Hague cases,214 but many courts do 
not.  Federal courts have the authority to appoint representatives for 
children by virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,215 and 
perhaps by the state law of the jurisdiction in which they sit.216  State 
courts have found authority in their own state law provisions.217 
However, most parents fail to ask courts to appoint counsel for the 
child (although courts may have the authority, or even the 
obligation,218 to appoint representatives sua sponte219).  Nor do courts 
 
 213. See Bucher, supra note 2, at 150 (noting that Article 9(3) is innovative because 
it makes it “compulsory for the judge to designate a representative who acts as 
custodian for the child”).  The lack of appointed counsel for children in divorce 
proceedings appears to be an issue in many European countries.  See Branka Resetar 
& Robert E. Emery, Children’s Rights in European Legal Proceedings:  Why Are Family 
Practices So Different From Legal Theories?, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 65, 73 (2008) (noting that 
children participate in custody proceedings in less than five percent of cases in Italy 
and Croatia). 
 214. Some courts adjudicating Hague petitions appoint a guardian ad litem:  
Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-
CV-02415-WYD, 2007 WL 4548570 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2007); McManus v. McManus, 
354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005); Olguin v. Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004 
WL 1752444 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2004).  Some courts appoint an attorney who acts in 
the dual role of both the guardian ad litem and the child attorney:  Kufner v. Kufner, 
519 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2008); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 
2007 WL 1461794, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2007).  In divorce and custody 
proceedings, courts sometimes appoint two individuals, both a guardian ad litem and 
an attorney for the children:  Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 135 (Conn. 1997); 
Schain v. Schain, No. FA000156786S, 2002 WL 450387, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 
26, 2002). 
 215. See Kufner v. Kufner, 519 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2008) (using Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 17(c) as authority in a Hague Abduction Convention case); see also 
infra note 218 (describing Rule 17). 
 216. See, e.g., Wasniewski, 2007 WL 1461794, at *2 (using Ohio Juv. R. 4(B)(2),(8) 
as authority). 
 217. See Wittman v. Wittman, No. FA0740006469S, 2007 WL 826536, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2007) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-54(a) (2004)).  A court’s 
inherent authority to protect the interests of minors would presumably also be of 
use.  See generally 43 C.J.S. Infants § 329 (2008) (citing cases in Arizona courts, New 
York courts, and the Tenth Circuit where the trial court relied on its inherent 
authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child). 
 218. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c) (“The court must appoint a guardian ad litem—or 
issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent person who is 
unrepresented in an action.”); cf. Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 
1958) (reversing and remanding case because trial judge did not consider sua sponte 
whether minors should have a guardian ad litem appointed).  The court’s decision to 
replace the child’s representative, who is frequently the parent, would be reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.  See Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 
2004) (holding that while the court has discretion, “the court should usually appoint 
a guardian ad litem” when it appears that the minor’s general representative has 
interests that may conflict with the minor’s) (citations omitted). 
 219. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reports that federal 
court judges, in particular, are particularly “inclined to grant a motion to appoint a 
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receive many requests from third parties because few professionals 
participate in Hague proceedings (compared to custody cases).220 
Even when requests are made, some courts reject them.221
A. The Case for Appointing Counsel for Children 
If the decision to appoint counsel for children in Hague cases 
turned solely on whether children had interests affected by the 
proceedings, children would be appointed counsel in every case.  
Hague proceedings are very important to the children whose 
transnational movement prompted the legal proceedings.  Just like 
the abduction itself, the proceedings can have a profound impact on 
children’s lives.  The child may welcome the proceeding because the 
child wants to return to a loving left-behind parent.  Alternatively, the 
Hague proceeding may return a child to a country the child abhors, 
separate the child from his or her primary caregiver, or expose the 
child to a left-behind parent who has harmed or will harm the child.  
A return order may put the child’s physical and legal custody in a 
state of limbo or upset the child’s settled physical environment, 
causing the child considerable anxiety.  The proceeding may leave 
the primary caregiver who abducted her child anxious and depressed 
as she decides whether to return with the child, and the child may 
witness, and be affected by, her anxiety.  In addition, the child may 
experience the proceeding as frightening if the child is uncertain 
about what to expect, or alienating if the court does not listen to the 
child.  Alternatively, the child may feel that he or she has been thrust 
into the middle of a dispute that the child would prefer to ignore. 
 
guardian ad litem or to sua sponte seek the advice of someone who is not beholden to 
either parent.”  NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN & KILPATRICK 
STOCKTON LLP, LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE 
HAGUE CONVENTION 70 (2007), available at http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/ 
training_manual/NCMEC_Training_Manual.pdf [hereinafter LITIGATING 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES]; cf. Karen Prosek, The Family Court’s 
Expectations of Child’s Counsel, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 203, 206 (2007) (reporting 
that about seventy percent of the discretionary counsel appointments for children in 
Family Court are done sua sponte by the court). 
 220. For example, under some rules, mediators for the parties can suggest that a 
representative should be appointed for the child.  See, e.g., S.F. County Superior Ct. 
Rules, Rule 11.7(C)(2)(a)(3) (July 2008), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/ 
courts_page.asp?id=85541 (“The mediator may recommend that the Court appoint 
an attorney to represent any child involved in a custody or visitation proceeding.”).  
Mediation is not as common in Hague proceedings as it is in family law matters 
generally, at least not yet.  
 221. See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, No. 08-690, 2008 WL 2217608, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 
May 27, 2008) (finding no authority in state law for an appointment in a Hague 
case); Hasan v. Hasan, No. 03-11960-GAO, 2004 WL 57073, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 13, 
2004) (claiming an appointment would lead the court to litigate the children’s best 
interests, something prohibited by the Convention). 
  
2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 379 
                                                
1. Potential conflicts of interest 
Although the child has a tremendous interest in the process as well 
as the outcome of the Hague proceeding, courts probably do not 
appoint counsel for children in Hague proceedings when asked, or 
when they themselves think of it, for the same reason counsel are 
often not appointed for children in custody disputes.  There is an 
assumption that the parents can adequately represent their children’s 
interests.222  This assumption makes sense in the vast majority of 
custody cases because the court is trying to determine the child’s best 
interest and both parents are helping to inform the court’s decision 
on what is best for the child.  Yet this reasoning makes little sense in 
the context of a Hague proceeding.  A Hague case differs from a 
custody case in that a Hague proceeding does not adjudicate the 
child’s best interests.  Consequently, neither parent will necessarily be 
focused on the child’s best interest, nor will the court.  That reality 
makes a representative for the child imperative because there is a 
great chance that the parents’ positions will conflict with the child’s 
interests.223
A simple example illustrates this point.  Imagine that a left-behind 
parent seeks a fourteen-year-old child’s return, and the abductor 
seeks to block return by relying on the “well-settled” defense in 
Article 12 and the age and maturity defense in Article 13.224  Assume 
 
 222. See, e.g., Nancy Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Representation of Children, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1996) (“[I]t is not uncommon for courts to assume that 
the child’s interests [in proceedings such as custody] will adequately be protected 
either by another party to the proceeding or by the court itself.”) (citations omitted); 
Representing Children:  Standards for Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem in Custody or 
Visitation Proceedings (With Commentary), 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1, 2–3 (1995) 
[hereinafter Representing Children:  Standards for Attorneys] (“In the absence of a 
particular reason for assigning representation for a child, the representative 
frequently will merely duplicate the efforts of counsel already appearing in the 
case.”); see also C.W. v. K.A.W., 774 A.2d 745, 748 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (“Since 
both parties and the trial court are focused on the child’s best interests, it appears 
that the appointment of a guardian ad litem would not be proper absent 
extraordinary circumstances . . . .”). 
 223. See Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 1461794, at 
*2  (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2007) (appointing an attorney who would also serve as both 
the child’s guardian ad litem and attorney in Hague Convention proceeding because 
the child’s “interests may conflict with those of his parents and [the appointment] 
may be necessary to afford him and his family a fair hearing”); Rhona Schuz, The 
Hague Child Abduction Convention and Children’s Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 393, 430 (2002) (“[If] the test is whether the case belongs to a category in 
which there is a potential for a conflict between the interests of the child and his 
parents, separate representation should be ordered in nearly all abduction cases.”). 
 224. Article 12 states, in relevant part:  “The judicial or administrative authority, 
even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the 
period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the 
return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new 
environment.”  Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, art. 12. 
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that the child wants to remain with the abductor in the requested 
state, but prefers not to have her views expressed to the court.  She 
fears that sharing her view will harm her relationship with the left-
behind parent.  In addition, the child does not want her therapist’s 
records revealed to either parent, although the abductor seeks to use 
them to help establish that the child is well-settled, and the left-
behind parent wants to use them to demonstrate that the abductor 
has unduly influenced the child’s opinion.225  This scenario illustrates 
that the child’s interests may not be represented by either parent, 
and may in fact conflict with both parents’ interests. 
Practical differences between a custody contest and a Hague 
proceeding also make it more likely that the child’s interests will be 
ignored or misrepresented in a Hague proceeding. The assumption 
underlying the Convention is that abduction harms children.226  Yet 
the parent whose views are theoretically aligned with the child’s 
interests has little or no contact with the child.  The abduction takes 
the child away from that parent.  Therefore, as a practical matter, it is 
the abductor who is responsible for representing the child’s interests, 
but presumptively their interests are not aligned.  The abductor wants 
to defeat the return petition, but the Convention presumes that 
children should be returned.  Even if a particular defense exists (e.g., 
the well-settled defense), the child may have a strong desire to return 
to the habitual residence.  It is unlikely that such information will be 
presented to the court if the child is not represented, as the left-
behind parent may not even know the relevant facts.  Even where the 
abductor’s and child’s interests are perfectly aligned, the respondent 
herself may be unrepresented,227 which will weaken the presentation 
 
 225. See In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980, 986–87 (N.H. 2005) (holding that children had a 
right to assert a therapist-client privilege with regard to therapist notes that father 
sought in visitation dispute and stating “[t]he weight of authority in other 
jurisdictions supports protection for the therapy records of children who are at the 
center of a custody dispute or whose interests may be in conflict with those of their 
natural guardians”); Attorney ad Litem for D.K. v. Parents of D.K, 780 So. 2d 301, 
307–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the child had a privilege that the 
child could assert and that the parents could not waive).  It is worth mentioning that 
counsel may be able to negotiate solutions to such evidentiary conflicts.  For 
example, Gary Melton has suggested, in the context of health services, that the 
child’s participation may help the parties negotiate a way to release the clinician’s 
records, but with certain exceptions that the parties may agree upon in advance.  See 
Gary Melton, Parents and Children:  Legal Reform to Facilitate Children’s Participation, 
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST, Nov. 1999, p. 935, 940. 
 226. See Pérez-Vera, Report of the Special Commission, supra note 59, at 182 
(discussing the Conclusions of the Special Commission of March 1979 and stating 
that “abduction of children is contrary to their interests and welfare”) (citation 
omitted). 
 227. See, e.g., Grijalva v. Escayola, No. 2:06-cv-569-FtM-29DNF, 2006 WL 3827539, at 
*4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2006) (respondent appeared pro se and “there [was] no 
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of the child’s perspective.  Even if the abductor is represented, a 
court may discount the child’s views and assume the position is “not 
authentically the child’s own” because it is presented through the 
attorney for the abducting parent.228  Nor are experts regularly 
brought in to give the court an unbiased perspective of the child’s 
interests apart from the parents’ positions, unlike high-conflict 
custody cases that often involve custody evaluators.  This reality makes 
the child’s need for a representative more pressing. 
The possible conflicts exist not just at the time of the adjudication, 
but also at the time the return order is enforced.  Imagine, for 
example, that the court has ordered the child’s return, but the child 
absolutely refuses to get on the plane for the return trip.  Imagine 
further that the left-behind parent has asked the police to execute 
the order, and the police are ready to do so with force.  The 
respondent may sympathize with the child but may not bring the 
child’s situation to the court’s attention, especially if she thinks that 
she will be blamed for undermining the child’s return.229  These sorts 
of possibilities suggest that children should have counsel in Hague 
proceedings.   
Another way of thinking about the wisdom of counsel in these 
cases is to recognize that child abduction cases are high-conflict 
custody cases, even though the issue of custody is not being litigated.  
The need for children to have counsel in high-conflict custody cases 
is well recognized.230  In these cases, parents may be so focused on 
their own objectives (which can include, for example, punishing the 
 
evidence as to the wishes of the children”); In re Nicholson, No. 97-1273-JTM, 1997 
WL 446432, at *4 (D. Kan. July 7, 1997) (respondent appeared pro se and court 
determined the child did “not raise any substantial objection to returning to 
Germany”). In In re D (A Child) (Abduction:  Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, 
[2007] 1 A.C. 619 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), Baroness Hale suggested 
that the abductor may not be receiving a fair trial when she lacks an attorney. 
 228. Cf. In re D, [2007] 1 A.C. at 642 (suggesting the child should be heard in 
every Hague case unless it appears inappropriate and “[i]t is plainly not good 
enough to say that the abducting parent, with whom the child is living, can present 
the child’s view to the court”). 
 229. See Bruch, supra note 36, at 534 n.20 (discussing Re J). 
 230. See, e.g., In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980, 985 (N.H. 2005) (“[W]hen custody of the 
child becomes the subject of a bitter contest between mother and father, the 
personal interests of the contestants in almost all cases obliterate that which is in the 
best interests of the child.  It is at this point that it can be said that the interests of 
both parents become potentially, if not actually, adverse to the child’s interests.”) 
(quoting Bond v. Bond, 887 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994)); Am. Bar Assoc. 
Section of Family Law,  Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody 
Cases, 37 FAM. L. Q. 131, 153 (2003) [hereinafter ABA Standards of Practice] 
(recognizing in part IV.A.2.j that a level of acrimony is a factor a court can weigh in 
determining whether to appoint representation for children). 
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other parent),231 that the child’s interests are not adequately 
represented.232  The feelings and interests of the parents in Hague 
cases may similarly crowd out attention to the feelings and interests of 
the children.  In addition, child abduction cases frequently involve 
allegations of domestic violence and child abuse, and counsel for the 
minor is recommended for these sorts of cases too.233  In domestic 
violence cases, “guardians ad litem . . . help prevent batterers from 
using children as tools or pawns,”234 and ensure that evidence of 
domestic violence is brought to the court’s attention.235  The ABA 
observes that whenever the case has allegations of “dangers to the 
child” there is “an especially compelling need for lawyers to protect 
the interests of children.”236  Since a great number of Hague 
respondents allege that return will create a “grave risk of harm” for 
the child, Hague cases are particularly appropriate disputes in which 
to appoint a representative for the child. 
Conflict between the parents’ interests and child’s interests is one 
of the primary factors that motivates courts to appoint a 
representative for a child.237  A rule requiring the appointment of 
counsel in all Hague cases makes good sense because Hague cases, by 
their nature, are ripe for conflicts of interest, and the conflicts are 
unlikely to come to courts’ attention.  Consequently, a  categorical 
 
 231. Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children:  It is the “Right” Thing To Do, 
27 PACE L. REV. 869, 892, 899 (2007). 
 232. Id. at 871. 
So when should the child’s voice be added to the debate?  My answer is 
whenever the child’s interests and the parent’s interests are not aligned, or 
the same.  Most of these instances occur because the parents have lost sight 
of the needs of their children for some reason.  Three reasons that come 
instantly to mind are abuse and neglect situations, domestic violence in the 
family, and high conflict custody cases. 
Id. at 891. 
 233. See ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 153 (stating that appointment 
of counsel may be appropriate in cases of past or present family violence). 
 234. Honorable Sheila M. Murphy, Guardians Ad Litem:  The Guardian Angels of 
Our Children in Domestic Violence Court, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 281, 287 (1999). 
 235. Id. at 288. 
 236. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 152. 
 237. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 205 F.R.D. 92, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(appointing an attorney as a guardian for children in civil rights action brought by 
their mothers, alleged domestic violence victims, against agency for removal of the 
children; a “potential for conflict of interest” between the mothers and their children 
existed); Ford v. Ford, 216 N.W.2d 176, 177 (Neb. 1974) (approving independent 
counsel for children in a divorce proceeding to determine the legitimacy of the 
children, reasoning that a decision as to the legitimacy of the children is one in 
which the children have vital interests that may be adverse to those of the parents); 
see also LOWE, EVERALL & NICHOLS, supra note 49, at 365 (noting “the perceived 
inability of or inappropriateness for either parent to represent the children’s view” as 
the “common feature” in various Hague cases where counsel was appointed for the 
child). 
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rule is entirely appropriate for these high-conflict cases and would 
save the court the time and expense of individualized assessments. 
2. Other policy justifications 
There are at least six other reasons why children in Hague 
proceedings should have counsel, apart from guaranteeing that their 
interests are accounted for.238  First, the child’s representative can 
help ensure that all of the evidence relevant to an important issue, 
like a “grave risk of harm” defense, is brought to the court’s 
attention.  The child’s representative acts as a fact investigator for the 
court, either directly as a guardian ad litem or indirectly as a lawyer for 
the child.  In one case, for example, the guardian ad litem (an 
attorney) reviewed the records of the foreign country’s proceedings 
as well as the foreign law and raised concerns about whether contact 
between the mother and child would be terminated if the child were 
returned.239  An additional fact investigator can be critical because the 
parties’ lawyers do not always gather all the relevant facts for whatever 
 
 238. There may also be a procedural due process right to counsel, but this Article 
does not explore that possibility.  Cf. Barbara Atwood, The Voice of the Indian Child:  
Strengthening the Indian Child Welfare Act Through Children’s Participation, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 127, 138–39 (2008) (discussing the constitutional right to counsel in abuse and 
neglect proceedings under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).  Arguably the 
same analysis would apply if the court is relying on foster care in the habitual 
residence to protect the child.  As Atwood states, 
Children have profound liberty interests in their own safety, health and well-
being as well as interests in maintaining the integrity of the family unit and 
protecting their family relationships.  An erroneous decision to place a child 
in foster care will harm the child by the removal itself, the out-of-home living 
experience, and the consequent disruption in family relationships. 
Id. 
 239. In re Marriage of Ieronimakis, 831 P.2d 172, 194–95 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); 
see also Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2007 WL 4548570, at *2 (D. 
Colo. Dec. 19, 2007) (appointing a guardian ad litem “to aid [the judge] in 
understanding all of the pertinent factors concerning the minor children”).  In 
Lieberman, the duties of the guardian ad litem included the following: 
 (1) to investigate all aspects of the social background of each of the minor 
children by talking to the Petitioner, Respondent, the minor children, 
reviewing court records from legal proceedings in Mexico and engaging in 
any further fact inquiry or investigation that the guardian ad litem deems 
appropriate; (2) to investigate Respondent’s allegations of abuse, 
mistreatment of each of the minor children for the purpose of determining 
if Respondent’s allegations are accurate, truthful and verifiable; (3) to 
provide facts, evidence and recommendations, as to each child, concerning 
whether returning said child to Mexico would expose him or her to a grave 
risk of physical or emotional harm or otherwise subject the child to an 
intolerable situation; and to investigate the wishes of the children and their 
respective maturity levels (to the extent that these issues relate to exceptions 
within ICARA) and make appropriate recommendations on this point. 
Id.; see Olguin v. Santana, No. 03 CV 6299(JG), 2004 WL 1752444, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 5, 2004) (instructing the guardian ad litem to conduct fact investigation of 
various issues). 
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reason, and courts do not necessarily ask the parties to obtain the 
critical evidence.240  For example, the district court in Adan v. Avans 
chided the respondent, in response to her motion for 
reconsideration, for not asking for an independent evaluation of 
whether the child had experienced child abuse.241  A representative 
for the child would undoubtedly have done so.  Courts even receive 
useful information when the child’s representative finds that there is 
no useful information to bring to the court’s attention after a diligent 
search.  In one recent case, the guardian ad litem investigated 
allegations of abuse and suggested the allegations lacked evidentiary 
support.242  Apart from fact investigation, the child’s representative 
can make appropriate arguments so that the evidence’s relevance is 
made manifest.  In some cases with allegations of domestic violence, 
the abductor never raises the Article 13(b) defense and consequently 
the allegations have limited legal significance.243
The child’s attorney would presumably assist the court through fact 
investigation and argument on other aspects of the case too, not just 
the Article 13(b) defense.244  Yet it seems particularly essential to have 
 
 240. See Nunez v. Ramirez, No. CV 07-01205-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 898658, at *5 n.5 
(D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2008) (suspecting that “psychological harm might result” from the 
separation of the mother and child, but the mother failed to present evidence on 
this point and “the Court’s review of the authorities has not revealed a case in which 
a Court, sua sponte, has ordered a psychological examination of the children”).  But 
see FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“Appointment.  The court may on its own motion or on the 
motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be 
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may 
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert 
witnesses of its own selection.”). 
 241. Adan v. Avans, No. 04-5155 (WHW), 2007 WL 2212711, at *3  (D.N.J. July 30, 
2007), rev’d, In re Adan, 544 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 242. Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2008 WL 1744353, at *3 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 10, 2008); see also Robles Antonio v. Barrios Bello, No. Civ.A.1:04-CV-1555-
T, 2004 WL 1895126, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 7, 2004) (relying on report of guardian ad 
litem in finding there was no evidence that the petitioner ever abused the child and 
recommending that the child be returned to Mexico). 
 243. See In re B. Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185–86 n.1, 4 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(explaining that the mother alleged that the father was physically abusive and was 
arrested for domestic violence); Washiewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 
2007 WL 2462643, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2007) (denying stay pending appeal 
and holding it was not error to exclude evidence of alleged child abuse when 
allegations are not relevant to age and maturity defense, and respondent never 
raised an Article 13(b) defense).  In other cases, appellate courts have reprimanded 
trial courts for failure to hear from children who were of sufficient age and maturity, 
apparently because no one suggested they should be heard.  See In re Marriage of 
Witherspoon, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 594–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that the ages 
of the children and surrounding circumstances suggested the trial court should hear 
from the children on remand). 
 244. See Schuz, supra note 223, at 431–32 (suggesting that an attorney should be 
appointed, inter alia:  (1) when there is a question as to where the child habitually 
resided; (2) when the grave risk of harm exception may apply; (3) where the consent 
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a representative for the child in any case where an Article 13(b) 
defense is, or should be, raised, simply because the potential harm to 
the child of a mistaken ruling is so dire and the likelihood of a 
mistake is so great in these expeditious proceedings.245  Involving 
additional lawyers can help get all the evidence gathered in the short 
time before the hearing.246
Second, children need counsel in Hague cases because a 
Convention defense relates to the child’s own views.247  The ABA 
recommends appointing a representative for the child whenever the 
child’s concerns or views are relevant to a custody action.248  The same 
rationale applies in the Hague context.  The attorney can educate the 
child about the benefits or disadvantages of stating his or her views, 
help the child develop his or her views, and assist the child in 
articulating his or her reasons for the views. 
Counsel can also inform the court that the child wants to be heard 
when neither parent plans to call the child.249  Providing an attorney 
 
or acquiescence defense is asserted; and (4) where evidence shows the child objects 
to being returned). 
 245. Hague Abduction Convention, supra note 1, at art. 11. 
 246. See Basil v. Ibis Aida De Teresa Sosa, No. 8:07-CV-918-T-27TGW, 2007 WL 
2264599, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2007).  In Basil, the petition was served on the 
respondent on May 29, 2007.  Id.  The June 7, 2007 hearing was postponed until June 
14, 2007 because petitioner had just retained counsel and needed time to respond to 
the petition.  Id.  On June 14, the respondent asked for a continuance in order “to 
further the evidentiary foundation” for the Article 13(b) defense, which was based 
on spousal violence.  Id.  The court denied the motion and called the request for a 
continuance “implicitly acknowledg[ing] that the evidence she presented does not 
rise to the level of a grave risk.”  Id. at *13 n.15. 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 11 (giving text of Article 13 “age and 
maturity” defense).  This defense, in whole or in part, was the basis for refusing to 
return the child in thirteen percent of cases of judicial non-return in the United 
States in 2002, up from zero cases in 1999.  Compare Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006,  A Statistical Analysis of Applications 
Made in 2003 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction:  National Reports, Prelim Doc. No. 3, Part II, at 645 (Oct. 
2006), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_pd03efs2006.pdf 
(reporting that thirteen percent of U.S. cases involving judicial refusal to return the 
child were based on the child’s objection), with Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, October 30–November 9, 2006, 1991 Statistical Analysis, Part II:  
National Report United States, Prelim. Doc. No. 3, at 13 (2001), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=2857 (reporting 
that none of the ten U.S. cases of judicial non-return were based upon the child’s 
objection to return). 
 248. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 153 (VI.A.2.c). 
 249. See In re Marriage of Witherspoon, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 594–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2007) (stating that thirteen and eleven-year-old children should be heard by the trial 
court on remand even though neither party called them to express their 
preferences); Bruch, supra note 36, at 534 n.20 (discussing Re J, a case involving a 
mother who did not bring to the court’s attention her son’s fears about the father’s 
alleged abuse because, the court opined, she feared being blamed for trying to 
influence the child, and the older child’s views were only made known to the court 
when the older child obtained his own counsel and appealed the decision ordering 
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for the child guarantees that the child has the opportunity to express 
his or her views, either directly or through the representative, 
consistent with Article 12 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.250  Having the opportunity to participate can be very important 
to a child’s well-being.  Joan Kelly, a clinical psychologist and 
researcher, reports that children excluded from the divorce process 
“complain about feeling isolated and lonely . . . and many older 
youngsters express anger and frustration about being left out.”251  In 
fact, “a huge body of research show[s] that for children . . . perceived 
control is related to mental health,”252 including research from child 
protection proceedings.253  Research by Reunite, a U.K. charity 
focused on international child abduction, indicates that these 
findings are probably equally applicable to abduction proceedings.254
 
return).  As Baroness Hale of Richmond stated in one Hague Abduction Convention 
case before the House of Lords: 
[T]here is now a growing understanding of the importance of listening to 
the children involved in children’s cases.  It is the child, more than anyone 
else, who will have to live with what the court decides.  Those who do listen 
to children understand that they often have a point of view which is quite 
distinct from that of the person looking after them.  They are quite capable 
of being moral actors in their own right.  Just as the adults may have to do 
what the court decides whether they like it or not, so may the child.  But that 
is no more a reason for failing to hear what the child has to say than it is for 
refusing to hear the parents’ views. 
In re D (A Child) (Abduction:  Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 A.C. 
619, 641 (H.L.)(appeal taken from Eng.)(U.K.). 
 250. Article 12 states: 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her 
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the 
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the 
age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity 
to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the 
child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in 
a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law. 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 23.  The United States is not 
a party to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).  However, our 
Hague treaty partners are parties to the CRC.  Therefore, the United States’s respect 
for the CRC is important if the United States is to maintain an interpretation of the 
Hague Convention that is uniform with our treaty partners. 
 251. Joan B. Kelly, Psychological and Legal Interventions for Parents and Children in 
Custody and Access Disputes:  Current Research and Practice, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 129, 
149 (2002). 
 252. Melton, supra note 225, at 938. 
 253. See Atwood, supra note 238, at 145–46 (“Research shows that children [in 
child protection proceedings] resent their exclusion from decision-making involving 
their welfare and suffer low self-esteem and feelings of powerlessness when they are 
not consulted or informed about actions taken that affect them.”). 
 254. See Marilyn Freeman & Anne-Marie Hutchinson, The Voice of the Child In 
International Child Abduction, [2007] INT’L FAM. L. 177, 177 (reporting the findings 
from International Child Abduction, The Effects (Reunite 2006), including that 
“[c]hildren reported feeling a lack of faith as a result of having been failed by the 
  
2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 387 
                                                
However, just as some children do not want the responsibility of 
expressing their preferences during a custody adjudication,255 some 
children undoubtedly feel similarly during a Hague proceeding.  In 
fact, making a choice can “create stress and compromise parent-child 
relationships.”256  Counsel for the child can inform the court whether 
the child wants to express his or her own thoughts and what  the 
boundaries are for any such testimony.  For example, the child may 
want to be heard, but may not want to express a preference for 
staying or returning. 
Lawyers are also very important for influencing courts’ receptivity 
to children’s views.  The Convention leaves the age at which a child 
should be heard to the “discretion of the competent authorities.”257  
Case law demonstrates that the determination is highly 
individualized, although courts have sometimes imposed a 
categorical age requirement.258  When courts have discounted 
children’s views because of their age, either categorically259 or 
otherwise,260 the children often have lacked attorneys.  Children 
would benefit from having advocates argue that they are old enough 
to have their voices heard. 
After the attorney helps a child clear the age hurdle, the attorney 
can argue that the child’s views should make a difference to the 
outcome.  Part of the argument is legal, as there are “conflicting 
interpretations in U.S. courts” about the form an objection should 
take.261  Part of the argument is factual, as some courts discount 
 
legal system and the adults involved” because children were not taken seriously and 
“their views [were] not carrying much weight”).  
 255. Kelly, supra note 251, at 151 (“Children not only clearly understand the 
difference between expressing their thoughts and making final decisions, but most 
state that they do not want to make autonomous choices.”). 
 256. Id. at 151.  
 257. See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 30 (“[A]ll efforts to 
agree on a minimum age at which the views of the child could be taken into account 
failed, since all the ages suggested seemed artificial, even arbitrary.  It seemed best to 
leave the application of this clause to the discretion of the competent authorities.”). 
 258. See Tahan v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486, 490 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) 
(holding that the defense “simply does not apply to a nine-year-old child”). 
 259. Id. (child was unrepresented). 
 260. See In re B Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1198 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2007) 
(ten-year-old child); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-2548, 2007 WL 
2344760 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2007) (thirteen-year-old child); Yang v. Tsui, No. 2:03-
cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2006) (ten-year-old child); 
Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603 (E.D. Va. 2002) (thirteen-year-old child). 
 261. Anastacia M. Greene, Seen and Not Heard?  Children’s Objections Under the Hague 
Convention on International Child Abduction, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 105, 137 
(2005).  For example, some courts require that the child’s objection be based on the 
problems with the habitual residence, and not the benefits of the abducted-to state 
or the problems with the left-behind parent. 
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children’s views based on the child’s immaturity,262 or the abductor’s 
influence,263 or a variety of weak or debatable reasons.264  The 
decisions are simply “idiosyncratic.”265  As one court noted, “[t]he 
results reached in published decisions seem to vary considerably, 
 
 262. See, e.g., England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 272–73 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding 
thirteen-year-old child was not mature enough for the court to consider her view 
under Article 13 because she had multiple foster care placements, Attention Deficit 
Disorder, a Ritalin prescription, and learning disabilities); Hazbun Escaf v. 
Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding that thirteen-year-old 
child was “not exceptionally mature”).  There is no “set criteria for determining 
‘maturity’” and courts have evaluated child’s maturity with and without expert 
testimony.  Greene, supra note 261, at 132. 
 263. Lieberman v. Tabachnik, No. 07-cv-02415-WYD, 2008 WL 1744353, at *15 (D. 
Colo. Apr. 10, 2008) (refusing to honor child’s preference because of possibility that 
child was influenced by respondent); In re B. Del C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 
(discounting ten-year-old’s testimony because she used the word “harassed” and 
“lovable” which suggested adult influence); Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriquez, 200 F. Supp. 
2d 603, 615 (E.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to honor thirteen-year-old child’s preference, 
in part, because “some of [thirteen year old’s] statements regarding reasons for 
staying in the United States appear to be the product of suggestion, echoing the 
preferences of his father”); see also Department of State, Hague International Child 
Abduction Convention:  Text & Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (1986) 
(“A child’s objection to being returned may be accorded little if any weight if the 
court believes that the child’s preference is the product of the abductor parent’s 
undue influence over the child.”).  But see Laguna v. Avila, No. 07-CV-5136 (ENV), 
2008 WL 1986253, at *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2008) (granting defense when thirteen-
year-old child exhibited, inter alia, “a perceptive understanding of the key issues 
presented for trial” and stating, “the risk of undue influence . . . is no excuse for 
judicial paralysis.  Such testimony should be taken, considered, and where 
appropriate, can support an age and maturity defense.”) (citations omitted); Kofler 
v. Kofler, Civil No. 07-5040, 2007 WL 2081712, at *9 (W.D. Ark. July 18, 2007) 
(finding that children’s views were not unduly influenced by respondent, although it 
was respondent’s impetus that led them to write letters to the court); Blondin v. 
Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (coaching by abductor was not 
equivalent to “undue influence”). 
 264. See, e.g., Lopez v. Alcala, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1257–59 (M.D. Fla. 2008) 
(discounting ten-year-old’s statement that he did not want to return “to Mexico 
primarily out of concern for his mother”—after child testified to a court-appointed 
child psychologist that he “recalled [the father] hitting and kicking their mother”—
because, inter alia, “[t]he well-being of his mother should not be a child’s concern”); 
In re B. Del C.S.B., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (discounting ten-year-old’s views because 
although the child  “objects to being returned to a country she has not visited in five 
years, and to a father she has not seen in five years,” she  “cannot be expected to 
weigh the immediate yet short-term effects of returning to Mexico against the 
barriers she will face as she matures into adulthood as an illegal alien in the United 
States”); Toiber v. Toiber, [2006] 208 O.A.C. 385, 393 (Ont. Ct. App.)(Can.) (calling 
thirteen-year-old’s statement that she did not want to go back to Israel and that she 
disliked her father no more “than those often expressed by a child caught in the 
vortex of a custody battle”). Compare Toiber, supra, with LOWE, EVERALL & NICHOLS, 
supra note 49, at 334 (discussing rulings where courts have held that the word 
“objects” has its literal meaning and does not mean views more impassioned than in 
a typical custody dispute). 
 265. See De Silva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Given the fact-
intensive and idiosyncratic nature of the inquiry, decisions applying the age and 
maturity exception are understandably disparate.”). 
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even among children in a similar age group.”266  Counsel for the child 
can also address the policy concerns that sometimes lead courts to 
reject the defense, even when they find children to be of age and 
mature.  While a number of courts have recognized that “a court may 
refuse repatriation solely on the basis of a considered objection to 
returning by a sufficiently mature child,”267 a number of other courts 
have cautioned that honoring a child’s decision can undermine the 
Convention.268  Zealous advocacy for the child is essential in light of 
all of the factors that courts consider when deciding whether to heed 
or ignore a child’s voice.  As the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children has posited:  “Why would one object to giving the 
child a voice in such an important decision?  Certainly, it is difficult 
to argue that the child should not have an advocate.”269
Third, counsel may help alleviate the stress that the Hague 
proceeding produces in the child.  Counsel can advocate for 
procedures that will mitigate the child’s discomfort.  For example, it 
may be important for a particular child not to speak with the judge 
directly or to have a support person there when the conversation 
occurs (i.e., his or her lawyer).  Joan Kelly notes that “[f]rom a 
clinical perspective, being interviewed in chambers is a formidable 
and inherently stressful experience for most school-aged 
youngsters.”270  The Pérez-Vera Explanatory Report also recognizes 
 
 266. Man v. Cummings, No. CV 08-15-PA, 2008 WL 803005, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 
2008) (citations omitted). 
 267. See De Silva, 481 F.3d at 1286 (quoting Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 166 
(2d Cir. 2001)) (honoring child’s preference); Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 
(9th Cir. 2005) (remanding to district court for determination of whether children 
objected to being returned and whether they were sufficiently mature for their views 
to be considered); Di Giuseppe v. Di Giuseppe, No. 07-CV-15240, 2008 WL 1743079, 
at *8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2008) (honoring children’s preferences); Leites v. 
Mendiburu, No. 6:07-cv-2004-Orl-19DAB, 2008 WL 114954, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 
2008) (honoring child’s preference). 
 268. See In re B Del. C.S.B., 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (noting that child’s testimony 
was likely coached and that child did not grasp consequences of remaining an illegal 
immigrant in the United States); Wasniewski v. Grzelak-Johannsen, No. 5:06-CV-
2548, 2007 WL 2344760, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2007) (noting that honoring 
child’s preference may reward a parent for circumventing the Convention’s 
structures); Yang v. Tsui, No. 2:03-cv-1613, 2006 WL 2466095, at *15 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
25, 2006) (noting that child’s wish not to return to her habitual residence was a 
result of being wrongfully retained for more than three years and honoring the 
child’s wish would undermine the Convention and “reward the malfeasant parent”); 
see also JPC v. SLW, SMW, [2007] 2 FLR 900, ¶¶ 48–49 (Eng.). 
 269. LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES, supra note 218, at 71.  
NCMEC suggests some reasons why the attorney for the petitioner might oppose 
appointment of a guardian ad litem, but the reasons all relate to the possibility of 
expanding the proceeding into a merits proceeding.  Id.  This would not occur if the 
court focused on the Hague Abduction Convention and restricted evidence to the 
issues and defenses permitted by the Convention. 
 270. Kelly, supra note 251, at 154. 
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this fact.271  A major reason some courts appoint a guardian ad litem is 
to avoid requiring the child to testify.272  On the other hand, some 
children may find it important to talk to the judge directly.  
Determining which is true for a particular child can be important to 
the child’s well-being.  Counsel can also reduce a child’s stress by 
informing the child about the proceedings and answering his or her 
legal questions.  Finally, counsel for the child may be able to remind 
the court of other concerns the child has related to the proceedings.  
The child may have his or her own need to resolve the matter 
expeditiously, perhaps to begin the school year in a particular place, 
or to delay the execution of an order, perhaps until the school year is 
completed. 
Fourth, counsel can help secure the child’s well-being during the 
pendency of the proceedings.  As the ABA states, “[t]he purpose of 
child representation is not only to advocate a particular outcome, but 
also to protect children from collateral damage from litigation.  
While the case is pending, conditions that deny the children a 
minimum level of security and stability may need to be remedied or 
prevented.”273  For example, the court may need to increase the 
child’s contact with the left-behind parent, or impose conditions to 
prevent the reabduction of the child by either parent. 
Fifth, the child’s representative may facilitate settlement between 
the parents.  By emphasizing the child’s interests and proposing 
solutions that go beyond the zero-sum position of the parents, the 
child’s representative may help the parents find a middle ground. 
Sixth, and finally, appointing a representative for the child will 
enhance the likelihood that the child will follow the order.  There 
may exist barriers to the child’s cooperation, such as the timing of 
the return, and the child’s representative can make these issues 
known to the court.  Additionally, the child’s representative can 
 
 271. See Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report, supra note 59, at 433, ¶ 30 (stating that “this 
provision [the age and maturity defense] could prove dangerous if it were applied by 
means of the direct questioning of young people who may admittedly have a clear 
grasp of the situation but who may also suffer serious psychological harm if they 
think they are being forced to choose between two parents”). 
 272. See Wittman v. Wittman, No. FA074006469S, 2007 WL 826536, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2007) (appointing guardian ad litem to avoid forcing a ten-year-
old and seven-year-old to testify for either parent).  Obtaining the child’s testimony 
out of court may also facilitate its usefulness. Kelly notes that “judges are not trained 
in child interviewing skills, and generally lack knowledge about developmental 
differences in cognitive, language, and emotional capacities.  Thus, it is hard for 
even the most experienced judge to place children’s responses in an appropriate 
context and evaluate the weight that should be given to their wishes.”  Kelly, supra 
note 251, at 154 (citation omitted). 
 273. ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 154 (VI.A.2 Commentary). 
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monitor whether the order’s execution is unnecessarily harmful to 
the child.  As Professor Bucher suggests, the child should not be 
denied contact with the abductor if authorities could supervise their 
continued contact.274  Nor should authorities enforcing the order 
“inflict upon the child suffering that seriously endangers his or her 
physical and mental state.”275  Professor Bucher gives the following 
examples: 
the use of physical force on the child (physical violence, other 
corporal punishment, detention, use of drugs that impair 
consciousness and willpower), refusing to let the child say goodbye 
to the [abductor], the child not being taken charge of and 
accompanied by personnel trained in child psychology in order to 
take care of the child in such extreme and difficult 
circumstances.276
If the child resists the return order, the judge can best address the 
situation, which might require enforcing its order against the child, if 
the child has counsel.  Children subject to a return order sometimes 
refuse to board planes277 or threaten suicide.278  If a child’s opposition 
causes a ruckus, the pilot might not let the child board.  If the child 
was not a participant in the Hague proceeding, at least through 
representation,279 the child’s due process rights arguably preclude the 
court from enforcing its order against the child directly. 
 
 274. Bucher, supra note 2, at 152. 
 275. Id. at 153.  Professor Bucher, in discussing the Swiss Act, suggests that the 
Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense should be used to assess enforcement 
measures.  Id. 
 276. Id.  The Swiss Act addresses the enforcement of return orders.  It requires a 
court to consider whether its decision can be executed, see Swiss Federal Act, art. 
10(2), and requires a court to give specific instructions for the execution of a return 
order.  Id. art. 11(1).  Those executing the order must “take account of the best 
interests of the child and endeavour to obtain the voluntary execution of the 
decision.”  Id. art. 12(2).  The court also has the ability to stop the execution of its 
order.  Id. art. 13. 
 277. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 61, at 152 (discussing a case in which a 
child had twice refused to board a plane). 
 278. See Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1373, 1382 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 
(reporting that a week after the filing of the petition, an eleven-year-old threatened 
suicide if forced to return). The court, however, found that the parent had not met 
the burden of “clear and convincing evidence that the risk [was] sufficiently grave to 
warrant a denial of return[,]” given the doctor’s report that the child had no real 
intention of harming himself.  Id.  Further, the court stated that the abducting 
parent must not be “permitted to thwart a return by causing, or refusing to 
ameliorate, psychological harm to the child” by not returning with child.  Id. at 1382–
83. 
 279. See State ex rel. Partlow v. Law, 692 P.2d 863, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that trial court had jurisdiction in paternity and child support action under 
Uniform Parentage Act when child had a guardian ad litem who was an attorney and 
participated in proceedings, although child was not made party to the action). 
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At the point of resistance, the child’s counsel could seek a 
modification of the order, if necessary, especially if enough time has 
passed that a modification would be appropriate for that reason 
alone.  In In re F (Hague Convention:  Child’s Objections),280 the order was 
not executed for approximately eighteen months, due in part to the 
child’s refusal to board the plane.  The mother successfully asked the 
court to set aside the original orders based on the child’s 
objections.281  Not all abductors will act like the mother in In re F and 
seek modification, especially if the abductor has been ordered to pay 
the left-behind parent’s attorney’s fees282 and fears being penalized 
for the child’s resistance.283  However, the child’s representative could 
ask the court to reexamine the order if execution becomes a grave 
risk to the child’s physical or psychological well-being or otherwise 
places the child in an intolerable situation. 
Two facts make all of the reasons cited above for appointing a 
representative even more compelling.  First, many Hague cases are 
adjudicated in federal court, where judges often have little 
experience with cases that so profoundly affect children’s well-being.  
Second, no matter whether the case is heard in state or federal court, 
the judge is unlikely to have adjudicated a Hague Convention case 
before.  The novelty of these cases means that the judicial process 
and decision-making would benefit from a lawyer advocating for the 
child.  The judge would certainly sleep better at night knowing that 
his or her decision, which may profoundly impact a child’s safety and 
well-being, was based on the best evidence and argument.  As 
Baroness Hale of Richmond, of the English House of Lords, stated in 
In re D (A Child) (Abduction  Rights of Custody): “[W]henever it seems 
likely that the child’s views and interests may not be properly 
presented to the court, and in particular where there are legal 
arguments which the adult parties are not putting forward, then the 
child should be separately represented.”284
B. An Example:  Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello 
The previous section discussed the reasons why courts should 
appoint representatives for children in Hague Abduction Convention 
 
 280. (2006) FamCA 685 ¶¶ 25, 26, 82 (Austl.); see also In re HB (Abduction:  
Children’s Objections) (No. 2), [1998] 1 FLR 564 (Hale, J.) (Eng.). 
 281. In re F, at ¶¶ 25, 26, 82.  The federal police used some physical force to try to 
get the child to board.  Id. ¶ 26. 
 282. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11607 (2006). 
 283. See supra note 249 (discussion of Re J). 
 284. In re D (A Child) (Abduction:  Rights of Custody) [2006] UKHL 51, [2007] 1 
A.C. 619, 642 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
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proceedings.  The importance of doing so becomes even more 
obvious when one analyzes particular cases.  For example, the Mendez-
Lynch v. Pizzutello285 decision in 2008 demonstrates the advantage of 
the Swiss approach.   
The Mendez-Lynch children were abducted twice; both abductions 
resulted in litigation.286  The first proceeding occurred when the 
children were nine and six years old.287  At that time, the mother 
raised an Article 13(b) defense, alleging that she and the children’s 
father had many physical confrontations.288  The mother said that he 
“slammed a door into her, held her down, spit on her, placed his 
hands around her neck, pushed and ‘smacked’ her, and threw things 
at her.”289  The father denied any physical contact.290  The court never 
resolved the conflicting testimony, but concluded that the 
respondent had not met her burden of showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the “grave risk of harm” defense was made 
out because there had been no direct abuse of the children.291  The 
court said, “[t]he assessment focuses upon the children, and it does 
not matter if the Respondent is the better parent in the long run, had 
good reason to leave her home in Argentina and terminate her 
marriage, or whether she will suffer if the children are returned to 
Argentina.”292
The court also considered whether it should deny return because  
nine-year-old Dylan gave “uncontradicted” testimony that he “wants 
to stay in the United States and does not want to go to Argentina.”293  
The parties stipulated that six-year-old Brandon had “not attained an 
age or degree of maturity to make it appropriate to take his views into 
account.”294  The court felt that Dylan had attained the requisite age 
and degree of maturity,295 but exercised its discretion and ordered 
Dylan to return nevertheless.296  It noted that his memories of 
Argentina were those of a six-year-old, since he had been in the 
exclusive custody of his mother and away from Argentina since the 
abduction, and that his mother’s views had probably influenced his 
 
 285. No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 13, 2008). 
 286. Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *1. 
 287. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1350 (M.D. Fl. 2002). 
 288. Id. at 1350. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1366. 
 292. Id. at 1364. 
 293. Id. at 1362. 
 294. Id. at 1361–62. 
 295. Id. at 1362. 
 296. Id. 
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own views.297  The court concluded that the “return of Dylan . . . 
would further the aims of the Hague Convention,” and ordered his 
return despite his contrary wishes.298
In the second Hague abduction proceeding involving these 
children, many years later, the court again rejected a “grave risk of 
harm” defense and ignored both children’s views.299  The mother 
alleged that after she and the children returned to Argentina 
following the first abduction hearing, the petitioner verbally abused 
her and physically abused the children.300  These allegations, which 
the mother claims were supported by affidavits signed by the minor 
children,301 led the Argentinean court to award temporary custody to 
the mother and to suspend the father’s visitation.302  In 2005, the 
mother and children traveled to the United States with the 
permission of the Argentinean courts, but did not return when 
ordered to do so.303  The father again brought a Hague petition for 
the children’s return.304
When the Hague petition was heard in 2008, the children were 
fourteen and twelve years old.305  The respondent’s trial 
memorandum stated that the children “have expressed the desire to 
remain here in school, with their church, friends and extended 
family.”306  During the hearing, the judge spoke with the children in 
his chambers for ten minutes.307  After the meeting, the court 
expressed “concern about what might befall the children during any 
efforts they might undertake to avoid being returned to Argentina.”308
Nonetheless, the court ordered the children’s return.309  As for the 
alleged abuse, the court held that the respondent had failed to make 
 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934, at 
*4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2008) (stating the rights of the father overrode the desires of 
the children). 
 300. Brief of Respondent at *2, Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934. 
 301. Id. at *5. 
 302. Id. at *1–2.  The mother indicates that there were two police reports that 
discuss the beatings of one of the children, although the date and content of those 
reports is unclear.  See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 12, 
2008) (on file with author).  The father has not been contacted so it is unknown 
whether he would verify or refute the mother’s assertions. 
 303. See Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *1. 
 304. Id. at *2. 
 305. Brief of Respondent at *5, Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
 308. Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *3. 
 309. Id. at 4. 
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out the Article 13(b) defense.310  Regarding the children’s wishes, the 
court noted that, “[b]oth children adamantly stated their opposition 
to returning to Argentina.  They like the Gilmer County community 
and the schools they are attending.”311  The court “recognize[d]” that 
“being uprooted from this community is distressing to the 
children.”312  The court then said, “[w]hile the Court is sympathetic 
with their feelings, the Court finds that their desires do not override 
their father’s rights.”313  Regarding the children’s threats to take 
certain action if they were forced to return, the court was unmoved.  
The court refused to allow the process “to be manipulated by the 
threats of affected children.”314  Nonetheless, the judge’s order 
contained a footnote that suggests he found the children’s testimony 
troubling: 
[I]n light of the concerns raised by the children in their interviews 
with the Court, the Court urges the parties to allow the children to 
remain in the actual physical custody of Respondent upon the 
return to Argentina until the proper court in Argentina can 
address this issue.315
The court’s footnote meant nothing to the eventual outcome, 
however.  The children were returned to Argentina and placed with 
their father.  The children’s mother was unable to return to 
Argentina with them because her passport was not current and she 
feared criminal prosecution for child abduction.316  
According to the mother, who eventually traveled to Argentina, the 
children have not fared well upon their return to Argentina.  The 
mother reports that the U.S. Embassy in Argentina tried to follow up 
with the children, but the father would not permit it without a court 
order.317  Then, an Argentinean court, apparently without seeing the 
children,318 gave custody to the father and entered an injunction 
 
 310. See id. (noting respondent failed to provide the requisite level of proof of 
“physical and emotional abuse”). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at *3.  The nature of the danger is undisclosed. 
 315. Id. at *4 n.6. 
 316. There was no requirement imposed by the court that criminal charges 
against her in Argentina be dropped, as had been done in the first case, so that she 
could in fact return with the children.  Compare Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 
F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1366 (M.D. Fl. 2002) (criminal charges ordered dropped), with 
Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *4 (no order to drop criminal charges).  The latter 
opinion does not reflect whether her counsel made such a request. 
 317. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Apr. 4, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
 318. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 14, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
  
396 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:335 
                                                
against the mother forbidding her from seeing them.319  The children 
claim that their life with their father has been unbearable.  The 
children’s allegations against their father are detailed in a newspaper 
article written by an Argentinean reporter who has examined the 
court files.320  The mother also provided me with a letter Dylan 
apparently wrote months after his return to Argentina to Judge Story, 
the U.S. district court judge who entered the return order.321  Judge 
Story refuses to confirm or deny the existence of the letter, and it is 
not contained in the court file.  Assuming the letter is legitimate, it 
also paints a horrific picture of the children’s situation and clearly 
asks the judge for help.322  Subsequently, after many months of living 
with their father, an Argentinean court finally placed the children 
with a temporary guardian.323  At the time of publication, the fate of 
the children is unclear. 
What is clear is that the children were not represented at either the 
first or second Hague proceeding in the United States.  “[T]he Court 
endeavored to make guardians-ad-litem available for the children 
during [the 2008] proceeding,”324 but the children never received a 
guardian because the parties could not agree on an individual.325  The 
court could have, and should have, appointed a representative for the 
children when the parties could not agree on a specific person. 
 
 319. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (May 12, 2008) (on file 
with author).  In other cases, a custody proceeding may never occur in the child’s 
habitual residence after return, especially if legal aid is not available for the 
abducting parent.  See Freeman & Hutchinson, supra note 254, at 179. 
 320.  Guillermo Háskel, U.S. Mother Fights for Sons’ Custody, BUENOS AIRES HERALD, 
Nov. 15, 2008, at 2. 
The files are also full with [the boys’] allegations that their father beats them 
and kicks them, threatens to burn their faces in the stove, frightens them 
with reckless driving changing lanes and telling them “you want to commit 
suicide,” prevents them from seeing their mother, walks naked around the 
house urging the children to do the same, shows them porno magazines, 
leaves them locked and in-communicated when going away, and sleeps with 
a machete and a rifle besides [sic] his bed. 
Id.  According to the article, “Teófilo Méndez Lynch has only admitted to some 
disciplinary spanking of his sons.”  Id. 
 321. Letter from Dylan Mendez-Lynch to Judge Story (undated) (on file with 
author). 
 322. Letter from Dylan Mendez-Lynch to Judge Story (undated) (on file with 
author). 
 323.  E-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle H. Weiner (Sept. 9, 2008) (on file 
with author).  The judge stated, “I am obliged to adopt some measures…to stop 
violence against Brandon and Dylan.  That is a crime against the minors.”  Háskel, 
supra note 320. 
 324. Mendez-Lynch v. Pizzutello, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 416934, at *3 
n.4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2008).  
 325. See e-mail from Cathleen Pizzutello to Merle Weiner (Aug. 11, 2008) (on file 
with author). 
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A representative for Dylan and Brandon might have made a 
difference in so many ways.  For example, the attorney could have 
zealously advocated during the proceedings for their voices to be 
heard, and for an assurance of their safety and well-being if they were 
to be returned.  The attorney could have built a better case for the 
children given the facts underlying the alleged abuse.  The attorney 
could have argued vigorously that considerable weight should be 
given to their views.  After all, the sole rationale given by the court for 
disregarding the children’s views—that their views did not outweigh 
their father’s rights326—was an error.  Such reasoning would always 
defeat the defense.  The attorney also could have argued against the 
ridiculous position articulated in the petitioner’s post trial brief:  
“Allowing threats made by the children of self-inflicted bodily harm, 
if they are returned to Argentina, as the motivating factor for denying 
the return would open the floodgates in future Hague Convention 
cases to suicide threats.”327  An attorney focused on the children 
undoubtedly would have explored whether the mother could in fact 
return with them to Argentina and would have suggested an 
appropriate placement for them until the Argentine courts could 
evaluate the allegations of abuse.  The attorney for the children could 
have asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for a 
stay when the district court rejected the mother’s request, pointing 
out that once the children were returned the appeal was moot in the 
Eleventh Circuit.328  If the children had an attorney, the letter 
apparently written by Dylan to Judge Story could have been 
appended to a Rule 60 Motion329 or used as the basis for other 
advocacy on the children’s behalf.  An attorney for the children 
could have served as another resource to help ensure that the 
appropriate Argentinean authorities addressed the children’s 
 
 326. See Mendez-Lynch, 2008 WL 416934, at *4. 
 327. Post Trial Brief at 1–2, Mendez-Lynch, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 WL 
416934.  The argument is ridiculous because it makes all such threats irrelevant, no 
matter how likely it is that the threat will be carried out.  The children’s attorney 
could have also rebutted the petitioner’s assertion that the children’s “‘maturity’ 
should not be relied upon given the inherent instability in the Respondent’s ability 
to provide a stable environment for the children.”  Trial Brief Supporting 
Petitioner’s Request for Removal at 22, Mendez-Lynch, No. 2:08-CV-0008-RWS, 2008 
WL 416934. 
 328. Courts differ on whether the children’s return renders an appeal moot.  
Compare, e.g., Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2004) (case not moot), 
and Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 497 (4th Cir. 2003) (case not moot), with 
Bekier v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 2001) (case moot).  For all practical 
purposes, however, even if the litigation is not moot, the litigation is often over if a 
stay is not granted because the abductor’s attention is redirected towards 
proceedings in the child’s habitual residence. 
 329. FED. R. CIV. P. 60. 
  
398 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:335 
                                                
situation expeditiously and that the U.S. authorities were doing 
everything possible to protect these children. 
C. Are There Reasons Not to Appoint Counsel for Children? 
Some scholars claim that courts should not appoint attorneys for 
children because such appointments can change the nature of the 
proceedings.330  For example, Professor Linda Silberman has called 
“expert testimony,” “independent representation,” and even 
consideration of the child’s views “trappings” that “should not be 
imposed on a Hague proceeding because it is not a custody case.”331  
Similarly, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
has suggested that a guardian ad litem will investigate concerns that 
really go to the merits of the custody issue.332  Whether for these 
reasons or others, only a handful of the signatories to the Hague 
Convention appear to appoint counsel for children in Hague 
Convention proceedings.333
A Hague proceeding is not designed to adjudicate the merits of 
custody.  That said, children’s views are relevant to many of the issues 
that are explicitly part of a Hague Convention proceeding.  In 
addition, as discussed above, counsel for the child serves various 
functions apart from bringing forth evidence and argument.  
Nonetheless, courts may be reluctant to appoint representation for 
 
 330. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 61, at 187 (citing increased 
complications and a threat to the summary nature of the proceedings). 
 331. Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty:  Gender 
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 221, 244 (2000). 
 332. LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES, supra note 219, at 71. 
 333. Answers to a questionnaire disseminated in anticipation of the last Special 
Session appeared to suggest that courts in only the following countries had the 
discretion to appoint counsel for children, and the frequency of such appointments 
was either not indicated or varied widely:  Argentina; Canada; New Zealand; Panama; 
South Africa; United Kingdom (Scotland); England/Wales; United States.  See 
Collated Responses, supra note 88, at Question #9.  Yet, admittedly, not all countries 
answered the question.  In addition, a country may, in fact, make counsel for 
children an option even if it was not mentioned in the answer because the question 
was open-ended.  Id.  In fact, research by others suggests that the answers to the  
questionnaire did not capture all countries that provide counsel for children in 
Hague cases.  See, e.g., Schuz, supra note 223, at 432 n.175 (mentioning New Zealand 
“appoints a separate representative whenever the grave harm or child objection risk 
is raised, and France, which appoints a children’s lawyer whenever the children are 
old enough to have their wishes taken into account”).  But see id. at 432 (“It seems 
that most courts have adopted an extremely narrow approach to ordering separate 
representation.”); id. at 432–33 (mentioning one case in Israel and a few cases in 
England); see also William J. Keough, The Separate Representation of Children in 
Australian Family Law—Effective Practice or Mere Rhetoric?, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371, 403–04 
(2002) (explaining that the Family Law Amendment Act 2000 (Cth) states that there 
must be “exceptional circumstances” to justify the appointment of an attorney in 
Hague Convention cases). 
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the child if more evidence and argument will come before the court; 
Hague proceedings are meant to be expeditious.  However, it helps 
no one (and it can affirmatively hurt a child) for a court to make a 
wrong decision quickly.  As the High Court of Australia once said 
when determining that it was appropriate for children to have a 
representative, “[p]rompt listing for hearing is one thing; an over-
hasty and insufficient hearing is another.”334  If courts focus the 
parties and their counsel on what is relevant under the Convention 
and exclude evidence that only goes to the merits of custody, then 
delay should not occur.  In fact, the Australian court concluded, 
“[t]he presence of separate representation should not hinder, and 
indeed should assist, the prompt disposition of Convention 
applications.”335  In short, fear that counsel may try to introduce 
irrelevant evidence should not stop the appointment of counsel since 
counsel facilitate the consideration of relevant evidence, do so in an 
efficient manner, and help achieve other important goals. 
Undeniably, representation for children increases the costs of 
these proceedings.336  The costs must either be born by the parties337 
 
 334. See De L v. Director-General (1996) 187 C.L.R. 640, 660 (Austl.). 
 335. Id.; see also Schuz, supra note 223, at 431 (“There is no good reason why 
appointing an independent representative for the child should necessarily delay the 
proceedings.”). 
 336. The AAML mentions that “representatives for children may delay the 
proceedings and tax the resources both of the parties and the courts.”  Representing 
Children:  Standards for Attorneys, supra note 222, at 3, § 1 cmt. 
 337. A court can allocate the cost of the representation, as appropriate, pursuant 
to the cost provision in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 11607(b) (2006) (awarding costs to a prevailing petitioner unless “clearly 
inappropriate”); see also Kufner v. Kufner, No. 07-46S, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37435, 
at *8–10 (D. R.I. May 23, 2007) (ordering respondent to reimburse petitioner’s fees, 
including $13,340 for the court-appointed representative for the child); cf. Gaddis v. 
United States, 381 F.3d 444, 454–55 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding express statutory 
authority in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, as required by Crawford Fitting, to 
provide district courts with the power and discretion to tax guardian ad litem fees as 
costs).  The court might find such an award “clearly inappropriate,” however, if the 
respondent is indigent.  See Berendsen v. Nichols, 938 F. Supp. 737, 738–39 (D. Kan. 
1996) (reducing award under 42 U.S.C. § 11607 because of respondent’s financial 
condition and need to support his children).  An interesting question, which goes 
beyond the scope of this Article, is whether the petitioner could be taxed the costs of 
the guardian ad litem when the respondent is the prevailing party.  This is suggested 
by ICARA, International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 
(2006), which indicates that costs are generally to be born by the petitioner, unless 
the petitioner prevails and the cost-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3) 
applies.  42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(1),(2) (2006).  This would also be consistent with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), which embodies a presumption that costs 
should be awarded to the prevailing party unless such an award is “unjust,” although 
that rule has arguably been supplanted by the provision on costs in ICARA.  Id.; FED. 
R. CIV. P. 54(d).  For a list of state statutory and case law authorities for the provision 
of compensation to attorneys and guardians ad litem that represent children, see 
REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE:  250 JURISDICTIONS IN 2005:  HOW CHILDREN’S 
VOICES ARE HEARD IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS, U.S. COMPENSATION SCHEME 
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or the public if the parties are indigent.338  However, the cost of the 
representation is a negligible consideration when the parents agree 
to the representation and bearing its costs.  It seems highly likely that 
parents will consent to representation for the child when asked by the 
court to do so (especially when the court emphasizes its importance 
for the child and the court’s inclination to appoint a representative 
regardless of the parties’ consent).  Nonetheless, the cost of  
representation becomes a real consideration when it is imposed on 
an unwilling parent or the public at large. 
The cost of representation becomes less of an obstacle to an 
appointment, however, if parents have a moral obligation to pay for 
their child’s representation.  There are many lenses through which 
one might examine the parents’ moral obligations, and Professor 
Loken, in his article Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward 
Children, thoroughly canvases them all.339  While it is beyond the scope 
of this Article to make the argument that parents have a moral duty 
to pay for a representative under one or more of the various theories, 
it appears that such an argument can be made.  The moral obligation 
of the parent arguably arises if one is a consequentialist and seeking 
the best outcomes, or a Kantian bound by the categorical imperatives 
(including that human beings are ends and not means), or a 
contractarian like Rawls, who emphasizes the social contract 
established by those behind a veil of ignorance.  Loken’s own theory 
for imposing moral obligations—gratitude—also supports a parental 
obligation to pay for the child’s representation.340  Children who are 
in the midst of an abduction dispute have experienced and dealt with 
hardship, whether from the underlying parental dispute, the 
abduction, or the proceedings.  The child is therefore owed “a debt 
that ought to be consistently acknowledged and, when later 
circumstances permit, repaid by appropriate beneficence.”341  The 
parents would satisfy their debt, at least partially, by providing their 
child with a representative to guard his or her interests during the 
proceedings.  As Judge Wall stated in Re S, “[t]hat [expense] 
factor . . . is outweighed by the critical importance of this issue to the 
 
CHART (Jean Koh Peters, Supervisor 2006), http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/ 
summary.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2008). 
 338. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3153(b) (West 2004) (“[T]he portion of the cost of 
that counsel which the court finds the parties are unable to pay shall be paid by the 
county.”). 
 339. See generally Gregory A. Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward 
Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121 (1999). 
 340. See generally id. 
 341. Id. at 1185 (giving as an example a child living in a house with a severely 
impaired sibling). 
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children and for the need for their fully independent voice to be 
heard in the proceedings.”342  Others concur.343
Assuming parents are morally obligated to provide their children 
with counsel in Hague proceedings, then the government should step 
in when they are unable to pay, if for no other reason than to assure 
children’s equal access to justice in Hague proceedings.  The 
government, in its parens patriae role, arguably also has an obligation 
to shoulder the expense when the parents cannot, since 
representation is potentially necessary to avoid harm to the child.344  
Similarly, representation is important despite its cost if a court takes 
seriously the rights of children as set forth in the U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.345  For example, the South African 
Constitution, which is heavily influenced by international human 
rights instruments including the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, protects the child’s right to legal representation at state 
expense.346   
A more difficult issue from the court’s perspective is what type of 
counsel to appoint for a child in a Hague proceeding.  The court 
must decide whether to appoint a guardian ad litem, an attorney for 
the child’s expressed interest, or both.  Sometimes a statute will 
resolve this question, but it may not.  There are advocates for the 
various positions,347 although there seems to be an emerging 
 
 342. Re S (Abduction:  Children:  Separate Representation), [1997] 1 FLR 486, 
495 (Eng.) (finding potential for conflict between the mother’s views and the 
children’s views and interests). 
 343. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children:  The Ongoing Search for Clear 
and Workable Standards, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 183, 205 (2005) 
(recognizing the additional costs to parents if children have counsel, but saying “in 
some circumstances the cost may be justified by the benefit to the child and the court 
in having a separate advocate for the child’s voice”); cf. Wendland v. Wendland, 138 
N.W.2d 185, 191 (Wis. 1965) (“Inevitably [appointing a guardian ad litem to 
represent the interests of the children in a custody fight] will add to the expense of 
the divorce proceedings.  But such expense will be rewarding if the interests of the 
children are better served.”). 
 344. See generally Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the 
Twenty-First Century:  Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 381 (2000) (explaining the “modern” doctrine of parens patriae, and 
explaining that the government’s role has become too large in some instances). 
 345. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 23, art. 12.  The United 
States is not a party to this Convention, but the United States should be influenced 
by it because our treaty partners are parties to it and the Hague Abduction 
Convention should be interpreted uniformly throughout the world.  
 346. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 28(1)(h), available at http://www.info.gov.za/ 
documents/constitution/1996/96cons2.htm#28 (last visited July 24, 2008) (giving 
every child the right “to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, 
and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice 
would otherwise result”). 
 347. See, e.g., Judge Debra H. Lehrmann, Who are We Protecting?, 63 TEX. B.J. 123, 
126 (2000) (disagreeing with the approach in the ABA Standards of Practice for 
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“consensus” in the legal community that an advocate for the child’s 
expressed interests is the proper role for an attorney, primarily 
because “even specially trained attorneys are not equipped to 
determine what is in the child’s best interests.”348  The ABA Standards 
of Practice for Lawyers Representing Children in Custody Cases349 and 
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers’ Standards for 
Attorneys and Guardians ad Litem Representing Children in Custody 
or Visitation Proceedings350 provide guidelines for courts considering 
this issue.351  While a court’s decision may be informed by the age of 
the child, some advocates recommend a “child-focused assessment of 
the child’s needs” even when the child cannot articulate a view.352  
Other authors have discussed the options, and it is beyond the scope 
of this Article to consider the merits of each position.353  The only 
point worth emphasizing here is that the court must select a lawyer 
trained in representing children354 and knowledgeable about the 
dynamics of family violence.355
 
Lawyers who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases and the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in 
Custody or Visitation Proceedings, as both prefer the lawyer act as an attorney for the 
child so long as the child is old enough). 
 348. Ann M. Haralambie, Humility and Child Autonomy in Child Welfare and Custody 
Representation of Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 177, 179 (2006) (describing 
the major efforts to address this issue by the ABA, AAML, and others).  But see 
Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection Proceedings:  Two 
Distinct Lawyer Roles are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441 (2000) (“Trying to define a single 
lawyer role for children of all ages and all capacities is an impossible task.”). 
 349. See ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at 152 (describing the duties of 
the “child’s attorney” and the “best interests attorney”). 
 350. Representing Children:  Standards for Attorneys, supra note 222, § 2, at 8; id. § 3, at 
27. 
 351. For a helpful overview of the various reform initiatives, see generally Atwood, 
supra note 343, at 183. 
 352. Elrod, supra note 227, at 894. 
 353. For an excellent review of the topic, see id. at 869 (summarizing authors’ 
positions).  See also Volume 42 of the FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY, which contains several 
articles discussing the NCCUSL’s and the ABA’s model acts.  42 FAM. L.Q. (2008).  
Jurisdictions differ on whether a “child’s attorney” (who is required to advocate the 
child’s views), a “best interests representative” (who is required in some states to 
express the child’s views), or both are required.  For a very interesting overview of 
the relevant laws in child protective proceedings in nations around the world, 
including the United States, see REPRESENTING CHILDREN WORLDWIDE:  250 
JURISDICTIONS IN 2005:  HOW CHILDREN’S VOICES ARE HEARD IN CHILD PROTECTIVE 
PROCEEDINGS, JURISDICTION RESEARCH (Jean Koh Peters, Supervisor 2006), available at 
 http://www.law.yale.edu/rcw/rcw/juris_main.htm. 
 354. See ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, VI.B, at 156–57 (setting forth 
training that lawyers representing children in custody cases should have); LINDA 
ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT § 
12:13 (2007) (“To give the child effective representation, the child needs an 
experienced attorney who has special training in meeting the legal needs of 
children.”); Elrod, supra note 231, at 919 (“Lawyers for children . . . need to know 
how to talk to children and have training in child development, child advocacy, and 
  
2008] INTOLERABLE SITUATIONS AND COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN 403 
                                                
CONCLUSION 
Parties to a multilateral convention can learn from their treaty 
partners about ways to implement the convention better.  Courts in 
the United States would be well served to consider the Swiss 
legislation that seeks to improve the application of the Hague 
Abduction Convention by defining “intolerable situations” and 
requiring the appointment of counsel for children.  The U.S. 
Executive Branch is itself unlikely to seek an amendment to the U.S. 
implementing legislation to incorporate these types of changes, or 
any changes for that matter.356  Consequently, courts in the United 
States must take the initiative to follow Switzerland’s approach, 
assuming the Swiss reforms are worthy of emulation.  For the reasons 
expressed in this Article, I believe the Swiss reforms are very 
beneficial and hopefully judges adjudicating these cases in the 
United States will agree. 
 
 
child welfare.”); Representing Children:  Standards for Attorneys, supra note 222, § 1.2 
cmt., at 5–6 (discussing the training children’s advocates should have). 
 355. See ABA Standards of Practice, supra note 230, at VI.B.8-9, at 153 (setting forth 
training in child abuse, neglect, and domestic violence as topics on which lawyers 
representing children must be trained); Nancy Ver Steegh, The Silent Victims:  Children 
and Domestic Violence, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 775, 803 (2000) (“The effectiveness of 
either [a guardian ad litem or counsel for the child] depends upon that person’s 
knowledge of the impact of domestic violence on children and his or her familiarity 
with available services.”). 
 356. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) implements the 
United States’s treaty obligations in the United States.  42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11611 
(2006).  The State Department is reluctant to amend ICARA for any reason because 
opening ICARA to amendments might result in provisions that are inconsistent with 
the United States’s treaty obligations.  See Weiner, supra note 27, at 272 n.274. 
